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CRISIS COMMUNICATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE: A
STUDY OF THE NASA CHALLENGER AND EXXON VALDEZ
Amy O'Connor, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1998
This study examines the communication activities of two crises: the NASA
Challenger and Exxon Valdez and investigates the effect of accommodative and
defensive statements attributable to each crisis on organizational image. The survey
design queried respondents about organization image with questions about trust
worthiness, responsibility and willingness for future involvement with the organiza
tion, based on statements provided. Results indicated that when organizations issue
accommodative statements during a crisis, participants rated overall organizational
image more positively than when defensive statements were given. Research findings
are discussed based on the symbolic approach to crisis communication and the
investor response theory. The implications for future research using actual case
studies are discussed.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
No organization is immune to the prospect of a crisis. From product recalls to
acts of consumer terrorism, from environmental disasters to class action lawsuits,
companies have coped with crises throughout the history of the modern organization.
Yet, the number of companies that face crises has increased dramatically in the past
twenty years (Hobbs, 1995; Wisenbilt, 1989). Given the dynamic and often turbulent
business environment, the potential for crises has become an operating reality for all
organizations. Surprisingly however, fewer than half of all organizations actively plan
for a crisis (Business Week, 1985; Fink, 1986; Gonzales-Herrero & Pratt, 1995;
Gottschalk, 1993). This is in direct contrast to the considerable amount of time and
money most organizations spend on advertising, public relations and the development
of strategic business plans. By not developing a crisis communication plan, organiza
tions ignore the fact that one poorly managed crisis can destroy their market share,
image and credibility. Clearly a crisis cannot be predicted with absolute certainty, yet
organizations that develop effective crisis plans and do not allow them to languish on
the office shelf are in a better position to survive crises and increase the probability of
a positive outcomes (Fink, 1986; Kuklan, 1986; Meyers, 1986).
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The Crisis Phenomenon
An organization's ability to assess whether it faces a crisis situation is at the
heart of effective crisis communication plan development. Fink (1986) defines a crisis
as "an unstable time or state of affairs in which a decisive change is impending--either
one with the distinct possibility of highly desirable outcome(s) or one with the distinct
possibility of highly unde�le outcome(s)" (p.15). Other definitions include descrip
tions of industrial crises: �se crises are orgamzationally-based disasters which cause
extensive damage and social disruption, involve multiple stakeholders, and unfold
through complex technological, organizational and social processes" (Shrivastava,
Mitroff, Miller & Miglani, 1988, p. 285). Dionisopoulous and Crable (1988) define a
crisis in respect to public relations. They contend that a- crisis -is one
in which the facts
- --are unknown, the public expresses concern and public relations activities are to be
used to defend and account for the organization: �onsew�ntly, the role of public
relations is to protect the organization's image and credibility, to develop positive
opinion among publics important to the organization, and to provide a forum for the
organization to communicate with its publics (Benson, 1988; Coombs, 1985; Sturges,
1994).
One example of a company with a positive crisis outcome is Johnson &
Johnson. It survived two crises with the same product, Tylenol, in 1982 and 1986
(Benson, 1988). The company's ability to react promptly and appropriately to the
crisis minimized damage to the organization's credibility and profits. In each instance,

Johnson & Johnson issued product recalls, demonstrated concern for public safety
with advertisements that featured their CEO Burke, and offered to buy back Tylenol
from consumers (Benson). Most organizations are not so fortunate. Exxon and
NASA, for example, have been adversely impacted by recent crises (Small 1991,
Vaughn 1996).
In 1989, the Exxon Valdez spilled oil into Prince William Sound in Alaska
(Tyler, 1992). The public outcry was enormous and the media images of the oil spill
were highly problematic. Initially, Exxon CEO Rawl was invisible. He did not go to
the site to view the damage and offer a public response; rather, he sent his subordi
nates (Tyler, 1992). This enraged consumers, who believed Exxon was to blame for
the spill due to its lack of oversight which allowed employee error to occur (Barnes &
Hayes, 1995; Tyler, 1992). Similarly, NASA is plagued still by the Challenger disaster
over a decade later. The space agency's officials varied in their accounts to Congress
and attempted to maintain a level of innocence for the decision to launch the shuttle in
which seven astronauts lost their lives (Vaughn, 1996). Its communication strategies
that followed the crisis did little to minimize the damage to its credibility. (Rowland,
1986; Starbuck & Milliken, 1988; Seeger, 1986; Vaughn, 1996). Both organizations
did not execute the "proper" communication strategies for their stake-holders and thus
have received continued scrutiny and negative publicity for their actions.
Given the probability that an organization is likely to face a crisis during its
lifecycle, a significant challenge for management is the development of communication
strategies to support the organization and address stakeholders' needs. Specifically,
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crisis communication focuses on what an organization will say to its publics and how
the company will say it, for an organization's communication activities shape public
opinion about the organization and its products and activities. During a crisis, an
organization's communication activities have a larger impact on public opinion than

*

during day-to-day operations. Hobbs ( 1995) supports this point; he states that "the
battle to protect organizational credibility is most fierce during a crisis situation" (p.
323). An organization needs to be protected from liability, damage to market share,
loss of revenue, increased governmental scrutiny and consumer and employee dissatis
faction; these concerns often dictate the type of communication strategy used during a
crisis. To evaluate which strategy is most appropriate in a given situation is a complex
process; an organization must recognize the crisis stage and adapt its communication
strategy accordingly.
Crisis Lifecycle
Paradigmatically, each crisis, regardless of origin, can be reduced to the
following lifecycle: crisis build-up, crisis breakout, abatement and termination (Fink,
1986; Sturges, 1994). Each stage has distinct characteristics and strategic impli
cations for an organization and represents a change in how the crisis impacts the
organization and its stakeholders. This suggests that what may be an appropriate
example, in crisis build-up stage is inappropriate for the abatement stage. Further
more, as a crisis moves through the lifecycle, different publics come to the forefront.
For example, in the crisis build-up stage perhaps the key publics are likely to be the
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organization's shareholders or governing board; yet in abatement stage, the focus may
be on members of Congress due to the increased scrutiny that comes with a crisis.
The first stage is the "crisis build-up" or the "prodromal" stage (Fink, 1986).
Symptoms begin to appear that a crisis is on the horizon, often long before a trigger
ing event brings widespread attention. Deft organizations are attuned to these signals
and seek to communicate immediately to strengthen the organizational image among
relevant publics. By recognizing the crisis indicators, a company may avoid the crisis
all together or, at minimum, reduce some of the negative consequences.
The second stage is "crisis breakout" or "acute crisis" (Fink, 1986). In this
stage the crisis erupts and impacts the organization and its relevant publics. The
beginning of the crisis is indicated by the presence of a "triggering event" that signals
the beginning of stage two. Examples of triggering events include the moment the
Challenger exploded and when the first gush of oil hemorrhaged from the Exxon

Valdez. The level of impact may be significant with regard to the physical, financial
and emotional effects of the crisis on the organization, its stakeholders, and victims.
In the third stage, "abatement" or "chronic crisis," the crisis has subsided
(Fink, 1986). However, the lingering effects of the crisis, be they positive or negative,
may linger for years. This stage is characterized by inquiries, legal action, and con
tinued media coverage (Fink, 1986). Here, organizations work toward fixing what
precipitated the crisis or the defense of their innocence. This stage often proves to be
very costly for an organization due to the legal action that frequently follows.
The final stage in the crisis lifecycle is "termination" (Fink, 1986). At this
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point the crisis is no longer an issue for the organization or its stakeholders. To reach
a resolution allows an organization to move its focus away from the crisis. This does
not imply, however, that the crisis has not had a lasting impact on the way the organi
zation conducts business; rather in this final stage the crisis is no longer the sole focus
of the organization. This stage is characterized by a return to day-to-day business
operations.
While the above lifecycle is useful to define the stages of a crisis and to under
stand how a crisis evolves; the impact of communication activity is limited to a discus
sion of its effects during the crisis. This perspective does not recognize the organiza
tional communication activities that occur prior to the crisis and the impact they have
on the organizations' various stakeholders. Organizational crises do not occur in a
vacuum; rather, stakeholders hold impressions prior to and long after the crisis has
subsided. More importantly, the organization's reputation, credibility and goodwill
are based primarily on activities that occur prior to the crisis. Accordingly, pre-crisis
__
com-munication should be evaluated in conjunction with communication activities

-

during and after the crisis ta ru:;cura:tel, assess the success or failure of the chosen
strategies.
Crisis Typology
The origin of a crisis provides a means to categorize and compare and contrast
the event with other similar crises. Accordingly, scholars have developed a number of
typologies to explain and categorize crises. Fink ( 1986), for example, distinguished

7
between crisis events over which management has no control compared to crises in
which management has control. He contends that communication strategies differ
based on where fault lies in relation to the organization's management. Marcus and
Goodman (1991) support this concept; they note that crises differ in at least two
important ways: (1) on their effect on victims, and (2) in what can be plausibly said
about their causes.

---- fr

Fink's and Marcus and Goodman's definitions, in effect, imply that manage-

ment's actions influence the impact of a crisis; they do not acknowledge the veracity
of evidence in relation to the organization's responsibility, damage caused, and the
company's performance history and subsequent goodwill. These factors are tied
directly to a discussion of publics. Stakeholder theory defines publics as any group
that can affect or be affected by the operation of an organization (Allen & Caillouet,
1994; Coombs, 1995; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993). Examples of stakeholders include

employees, share-holders, suppliers, consumers, local community, media, competitors,
government, special interest groups and unions. Stakeholder theory suggests that
multiple publics exist with different attributes; subsequently, they have different views
of the same crisis situation. On the basis of these factors, this thesis, distinguishes two
different types of crisis: accidents and product safety incidents.
Accidents occur unexpectedly during the course of normal business operations
and plausibly are claimed as one-time occurrences. They are characterized by highly
interdependent systems and numerous interactions that lead to a crisis (Shirvastava,
et.al., 1988). It is for these reasons that accidents are difficult to predict and nearly
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impossible to stop once the sequence of interactions begins. Accidents have identifi
able and cohesive groups of victims and non-victims. Victims typically are repre
sented by legal counsel who have significant experience in this type of litigation and
capable of winning sizable settlements. In addition to the presence of victims and the
organization's systemic attributes, accidents are defined by the damage they cause. In
an accident, the damage to property may exceed the injury to humans; furthermore,
the human damage may not immediately be evident (Marcus & Goodman, 1991;
Sturges, 1994; Coombs, 1995).
Similar to accidents, product safety crises have identifiable victims who are
represented by legal counsel. However, with the possible exception of class action
lawsuits, the victims are not a cohesive body or easily identified. Product safety inci
dents typically occur over time; no single event creates mass damage instantaneously.
Consequently, product safety issues are characterized by repeated events and revela
tions and evolve over time. As such, an organization typically has numerous oppor
tunities to find solutions, change tactics, issue recalls or warnings in an attempt to
mitigate the affects of a pending crisis (Coombs, 199 5; Marcus & Goodman, 1991 ;
Sturges, 1994).
Understanding the crisis typology is helpful in the development of rhetorical
strategies. The ability of an organization to communicate with its publics during a
crisis influences how well the company will survive the crisis and its aftermath. '

;A:
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Choosing the Right Words
Communication commands center stage in a crisis situation. It creates meaning for stakeholders, facilitates resolution, and re-builds organizational credibility
(Bechler, 1995). The organization's choice of words coupled with those of the mass
media, government and other interested parties quickly create meanings attributed to �
the crisis (Barton, 1991; Bechler, 1995; Benson, 1988; Fink, 1986; Flecker, 1990;
Seymour, 1991; Sturges, et al. 1991; Tortorella, 1989; Wisenblit, 1989). Therefore,
choosing the communication strategy that is best suited to the crisis and the organization's various publics is critical. In a broad sense, the primary communication stra
tegic options for organizations in crisis are accommodative and defensive messages
(Coombs, 1995; Ice, 1991; Marcus & Goodman, 1991). These signals are located in
the various statements an organization makes in regards to a crisis.
Accommodative statements occur when management accepts responsibility for
the crisis, admits to the existence of problems attributable to the organization and

lJ<:

takes action to rectify the situation (Marcus and Goodman, 1991). Defensive communication messages, conversely, insist problems do not exist, and provide reassur
ance about the organization's ability to continue operating and resuming normal

-

business opera-tions quickly (Marcus & Goodman, 1991). -�e messages managemen.:__
sends can help to achieve the primary objectives of communication during a crisis

� appease third party interveners, provide explanation for the crisis situation
to stakeholders and others, and open an avenue of retreat (Becher, 1995; Marcus &

.tf
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Goodman, 1991). The degree to which the appeasement of third party interveners and
organizational stake-holders is successful can be measured by public opinion.
Public Opinion
Public opinion research is not limited to the exit poll results used during elec
tions. Rather, public opinion research has broad implications for organizations with
regard to sales, market share and future growth. In a crisis, for instance, an organization must assess public opinion and incorporate its findings into the development of
crisis strategies. Glynn (1984) summarizes that public opinion is a compilation of
individual beliefs, beliefs derived from the process of socialization, and the beliefs held
by referent groups. He contents that the formation of beliefs is an on-going process
that is highly influenced by events external to the individual. This view of public opinion supports the crisis lifecycle concept and recognizes the fluidity of public opinion
by recognizing that social actors influence public opinion and it changes over time
based on external factors. Cantril ( 1948) links public opinion to events and suggests
that public opinion is highly sensitive and does not become stabilized until the implica
tions of the event are clear. Additionally, events of unusual magnitude are likely to
produce radical swings in public opinion. The role of suasory discourse indicates the
opportunity for management to influence public opinion. Therefore, the primary
objective of crisis management is to influence public opinion so that post-crisis
opinions are not more negative than prior to the crisis (Sturges, Carrell, Newsom, &
Barrera, 1991). Unfortunately, the vast majority of organizations focus primarily on

t}
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damage control during a crisis and fail to address the impact of those strategies on

public opinion.

The link between crisis communication and public opinion is overlooked

largely in current literature; with the exception of Sturges (1991). While qualitatively
valuable, Sturges (1991) fails to provide quantitative data to support the link between
crisis communication and public opinion. Current crisis communication research primarily focuses on communication strategies, models of the crisis life cycle, and devel
opment of crisis communication plans thus largely ignoring the link between crisis
communication and public opinion. Marcus and Goodman ( 1991) have researched the
connection between organizational rhetoric during a crisis and investor response. This
research currently provides the best quantitative insight to public opinion fluctuations
based on crisis communication, albeit limited with regard to the narrow focus of inves
tors, rather than the public opinion of stakeholders broadly considered.
Purpose and Research Question
This thesis seeks to bridge the gap between current research on crisis com
munication and its effect on public opinion. The purpose of this thesis is to examine
crisis communication in relation to public opinion and subsequently to assess the
impact specific communication tactics have on an organization's reputation. Specifically, it analyzes the long-term impact on public opinion that accommodating and
defensive announcements have during accidents and product safety incidents.
While a crisis leaves an impression on diverse groups, such as the media,
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government, and investors, the organization's long-term reputation is adjudicated by
the court of public opinion. Accordingly, this study will seek to answer the following
research question: How does crisis communication affect public opinion? To answer
this research question, this thesis examines crisis communication activities of eight
organizations: four that experienced crises classified as accidents and four product
safety crises. Specifically, the four accidents analyzed are: (1) the Exxon Valdez after
the oil spill in Prince William Sound, (2) NASA's Challenger following the explosion
that killed seven astronauts, (3) Three Mile Island in the wake of the nuclear power
emergency, and (4) Union Carbide after the chemical leak that killed thousands in
Bhopal, India. The four product safety incidents reviewed are: (1) the General
Motors side impact pick-up trucks which resulted in fiery crashes, (2) the Jack in the
Box e-coli contamination in Seattle which left several children dead and others seri
ously ill, (3) the Procter and Gamble Rely Tampons and the products link to toxic
shock syndrome (TSS), and (4) the Suzuki Samurai following charges the vehicle was
prone to roll-over.
Hypotheses
An exploration of crisis communication strategies utilized by organizations
based on crisis type (accidents or product-safety) and rhetorical strategy utilized
(accommodative or defensive) and the subsequent effect on public opinion will form
the basis of this thesis. First, analysis of the statements made in reference to the crisis
to determine the type(s) of rhetoric used; second, statements will be compared in a
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survey to generate an understanding of public opinion. Thus, this thesis will test the
following two hypotheses:
Hl: If accommodative statements are offered in response to a crisis, public
opinion of the organization's image will be positively affected.
H2: If defensive statements are offered in response to a crisis, public opinion
of the organization's image will be negatively affected.
The testing of these hypotheses, then, will more fully develop the complex
relationship between crisis response strategy and public opinion.
Organization
This first chapter has positioned the analysis within the broad context of crisis
communication and public opinion and introduced the primary research question and
corresponding hypotheses. The second chapter reviews the communication activities
of the eight organizations and identifies the specific link between communication
strategies and public opinion. Once this link has been made, it follows that the third
chapter explains the methodology used to execute the study. Chapter IV analyzes the
relationship between crisis communication and public opinion while Chapter V con
cludes the thesis with a discussion of the crisis communication choices organizations
face and the manner in which public opinion informs the choices available to crisis
managers.

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Organizations faced with crises must choose rhetorical strategies that address
the institutional goals of the company while they simultaneously address the concerns
of key publics. Institutional rhetoric, in times of stability, focuses on delivering pre
packaged conclusions, disseminating a corporate image and asserting definitional
hegemony over public policy issues in a multifaceted effort to communicate with the
key publics (Dionisopoulous and Crable, 1992; Sproule, 1988). In a crisis, institutional rhetoric often becomes a necessary vehicle for organizational survival, for in the
case of major accidents and product safety incidents, a crisis results in a fundamental
shake-up of the way the public views those industries. Subsequently, the rhetorical
strategies companies employ have increased importance since the probability of gov
ernmental intervention and litigation is significant.
In addition to the well developed body of research on crisis communication
strategies, a similar plethora of research exists on crisis management. The research is
both practical in application as well as theoretical, with the latter relying heavily on
qualitative case studies. This chapter, then, explores crisis and crisis communication
research, public opinion theory, and a review of the research on the cases analyzed in
this thesis.
14
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Crisis Communication Management
Managers faced with a crisis can tum to a infinite number of crisis manuals
designed to teach the manager "what to do during a crisis." The information is found
in trade publications, scholarly journals, seminars and a variety of books (Barton,
1988; Dimond, 1997; Fink, 1986; Guth, 1995; Kotcher, 1992; Mitroff, 1988;
Patterson, 1993). The primary goal of all these materials is to provide the manager
with fundamental steps that theoretically can lessen the organizational damage
suffered during a crisis.
Crisis Communication Plans
One such area of current crisis research is consistent in the development of
crisis communication plans. Here, researchers provide a decision-making path organi
zations should follow and describe the elements that should be included in any crisis
communication plan. Central to this research is the premise that the development of a
crisis plan is fundamental to an organization's survival (Barton, 1988; Dimond, 1997;
Fink, 1986; Guth, 1995; Kotcher, 1992; Mitroff, 1988; Patterson, 1993). Further
more, these and other scholars agree that management should practice using and
update the plan on a regular basis (Benson, 1988; Coombs, 1995; Guth, 1995;
Mitroff, 1988; Patterson, 1993). This ensures, the reasoning goes, that when a crisis
strikes, an organization will be able to respond with some level of efficiency. As part
of the plan, researchers recommend the company name a spokesperson and train them
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to tell the organization's story and communicate with its stakeholders (Benson, 1988;
Coombs, 1995; Guth, 1995; Mitroff, 1988; Patterson, 1993). Ideally, this person is
the organization's CEO or other high ranking official. Also included in the crisis man
agement plan are media relations techniques and generic communication strategies,
(e.g., "tell the truth") that serve as remedial reminders for managers.
Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) have produced the most detailed crisis communi
cation manual to date. The basis for their work is research that indicated that among
Fortune 1000 companies only five to fifteen percent have viable crisis communication
plans. Based on this data, they developed components of the "ideal" crisis manage
ment program. The framework for Pauchant and Mitroff' s strategy is found in the
division of factors that should incorporate a crisis management effort. They devel
oped a typology of factors that includes: the strategic, the technical and structural, the
evaluation and diagnostic, as well as, communication, psychological and cultural
actions. Each action has numerous sub-points that an organization should address
during the development of a crisis management plan. Pauchant and Mitroff argue that
these action steps represent the fundamental difference between crisis-prepared and
crisis-prone organizations. The incorporation of the Pauchant and Mitroff crisis man
agement effort, so the implication goes, represents prepared organizations who view
crises as opportunities for competitive advantage.
Conversely, crisis-prone organizations see crisis management plans as a cost of
doing business. This distinction notes a shift in philosophy that is missing in the
majority of crisis literature. The recognition that crises present opportunities, in

17
essence, fundamentally changes crisis management efforts from reactionary to pro
active and broadens the scope of publics. For example, when an organization views
crises as a cost of doing business the likely response is to do whatever necessary to
end the crisis. However, if an organization sees crises as an opportunity it is probable
they will look beyond the immediate event and its obvious publics to other groups and
areas that can be maximized to the organizations benefit.
While this form of research is helpful to assist managers in the development of
crisis plans, it is short-sighted since it limits communication activities to those directly
linked to a crisis, does not provide for differences in crisis origin, and does not address
the rhetorical strategies available to organizations. Furthermore, the simplistic nature
of the plans does not allow for thorough analysis of the complex systems that lead to
the crises.
Models of Crisis Communication
A first step in introducing a more theoretical component to crisis research is
the development of models that explicate the nature of crises. Sturges (1994), for
example, has developed the Model of Crisis Communication Content. This model
consists of three components: the crisis situation dimension, crisis communication
choice, and crisis communication implementation. The model looks at different crises,
the corresponding communication strategies and reviews how each choice should be
implemented. He contends that this model provides a framework for future research
that regards communication in a crisis. The model corresponds with his research
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(Sturges, 1991) on the relationship between the formation of public opinion and crisis
communication activities. In each instance, Sturges (1991, 1994) suggests that the
type of communication activities employed should vary by crisis stage and target
audience. While this model defines a crisis with regard to importance, immediacy and
uncertainty, it does not provide a clear typology; thus organizations may assume
erroneously that the same process can be utilized regardless of typology. The inclu
sion of communication effects in the model, and the acknowledgment that pre-existing
public opinion has an impact on the communication strategy chosen by an organiza
tion, are important contributions to the study of the link between crisis communication
and public opinion.
This outward focus is supported further by Gonzalez-Herrero and Pratt (1995)
whose four-phase model, that closely mirrors Fink's (1986) crisis lifecycle, incorporates environmental factors, planning, and prevention techniques, assessment strategies,

------

and communication tactics into the crisis mix. Similar to Sturges (1994),_ Gonzalez

Herrero and Pratt incorporate communication activities in both pre-crisis and post
crisis stages and acknowledge the impact those statements have on the crisis commun-

ication process. T�cus on human-provoked, organizationally induced crises, �nd
claim that how a corporation responds to a crisis indicates the level of corporate'
'

responsibility. The four phase model includes an issue management stage, a planning
and prevention stage, the crisis stage, and the post-crisis stage. The issues manage
ment phase, for example, is characterized by an assessment of the environment and
data collection to determine potential trouble spots and the subsequent development

�
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of a communication strategy. Phase two, planning and prevention, includes policy
determination in which managers assess an organization's relationships with its
publics, study the depth and breadth of the situation, prepare contingency plans, and
select a spokesperson. During phase three, the crisis, the focus is on the organizations
message and how it is received by its publics. Post-crisis, the fourth phase, is charac
terized by an evaluation of the crisis management activities and the development of
strategies to off-set any damage suffered during the crisis. Gonzalez-Herrero and
Pratt (1995)emphasize the importance of research during each phase and contend that
all crisis management activities must demonstrate an awareness of public attitudes.
One weakness with both the Sturges (1991, 1994) and Gonzalez-Herrero and
Pratt models is the normative nature of the models. Crises are not all the same as the
crisis typology literature attests; rather, they vary by origin, effect, veracity of evi
dence and the speed at which they occur. One method that acknowledges the differ
ences in crises is found in the crisis typology literature. This body of research separ
ates crises by type as indicated by the origin of the crisis.
Crisis Management Typologies
Several scholars have developed typologies that are representative of the most
common forms of crises. The research is consistent in its findings and allows mana
gers to identify a crisis as defined by each framework. The first of such typologies is
Engelhoff and Sen (I 992) who developed an information-processing model of crisis
management that distinguishes between crisis types and the communication, decision

making, and dissemination of information that occurs both internally and externally.
The model "views crisis management as an information-processing situation and
organization . . . must cope with crises as information-processing systems" (p. 444).
The term information-processing includes communication, decision-making and the
containment of information in organizations which can best be understood in terms of
how organizations disseminate information and the processes used to communicate
within the organizational culture. This crisis typology further distinguishes between
the source of the crises: technical or sociopolitical (Shrivastava & Mitroff, 1987).
Technical failures are rooted in the core activities of the company (e.g., a shuttle
explosion, a train crash) while sociopolitical failures are occur in an organization's
operating environment (e.g., include governmental regulation, economic sanctions, or
a strike). The distinction in the origin of the crisis is critical to the processing of
information (Egelhoff & Sen, 1992). The second distinction involves whether a crisis
is a result of an internal weakness or an external threat. Internal weaknesses are a
function of organizational life and reflect how a company operates; this includes the
inherent benefits and drawbacks of the procedures (Egelhoff & Sen, 1992). Con
versely, external threats are described best as "�ng that lies beyond the relevant .,

--

environment" (p. 447). For example, external threats are not always immediately

obvious or controllable by the organization (e.g., consumer terrorism, natural disas
ters). However, when remote environments are at the root of a crisis, an interdepen
dency develops between that environment and the organization; this moves the crisis
to a relevant environment.
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Similar to Engelhoff & Sen (1992), Mitroff (1988) offers a crisis typology
which groups crises into "families" based upon their structural similarity. Mitroff's
grid encompasses the origin of a crisis, be it either technical/economic or human/social
with the severity of the crisis. Based on these dimensions, Mitroff defines five crisis
families: mega damage, psycho, breaks, external information attacks, and external
economic attacks. "Mega damage" refers to environmental accidents while "psycho"
crises include terrorism, sexual harassment, sabotage and rumors. The third form,
"breaks", includes recalls, product defects and operator errors. External information
attacks include counterfeiting, loss of information and copyright infringement while
external economic attacks include boycotts, bribery and extortion. The weakness in
this schema, however, is that a crisis can fall into more than one family. For example,
the Exxon Valdez on the surface is a "mega damage," however, it also is a "break"
due to operator error. Mitroff does account for this; he states that "breaks" are the
cause of"mega damage," yet the model does not represent the possibility that not all
"breaks" result in "mega damage."
Coombs (1995) offers a more theoretically sound, though not fully tested,
schema. He distinguishes between crisis type and suggests crisis response strategies
based not only on crisis type, but on evidence, damage, victim status, and performance
history. Rooted in the Attribution Theory, which assumes individuals actively search
for information to determine the cause of an observed behavior, Coombs' theory
cross-types two dimensions, internal-external causes and intentional-unintentional
causes, to form four crisis types. The internal-external dimension equates with the
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locus ofcontrol; as such it defines the catalyst ofthe crisis as an internal or external
agent. (Coombs, 1995; Russell, 1982) (e.g., poor management decisions). Conversely, external means the crisis occurred due to the actions ofa person or persons
outside the organization. The second dimension, intentional-unintentional corre
sponds with the issue ofcontrollability (Coombs, 1995). It is reasonable to assume
that an intentional act, one done purposively, is easier to control than that ofan unin
tentional act and thus has different communication implications. When the two aforementioned dimensions cross, four mutually exclusive crisis types are formed: faux pas,
terrorism, accidents and transgressions. A faux pas is an "unintentional action that an
external agent tries to transform into a crisis" (p.454). Faux pas typically center
around social responsibility; here the organization has to defend the appropriateness of
its actions against an interest group. Accidents occur during the course ofnormal
operations and are unintentional; examples include product defects, and natural disas
ters. These accidents are either human-induced or an act ofnature (Egelhoff & Sen,
1992; Newsom, et. al., 1992; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993). The premise, ofcourse, is
that the cause ofthe accident has implications for the type ofcommunication strategy
chosen by the organization. Transgressions, conversely, are organizational decisions
or actions that knowingly place publics at risk or harm them in some way (e.g., defec
tive products, disregard for safety procedures, and violation oflaws). Terrorism is an
�igned to hurt the organization that is done intentionally by an outside force,.___
(e.g., product tampering and sabotage).
Coombs takes the crisis types and applies three variables that affect crisis
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management: veracity of evidence, performance history and damage. These three
variables, coupled with Coombs' crisis typology, lead to recommendations for a crisis
response strategy. Nonexistence strategies include denial, clarification, attack and
intimidation, and seek to eliminate the crisis. Distance strategies acknowledge a crisis
while trying to minimize the linkage between the organization and the crisis. Specific
strategies include excuse and justification. Ingratiating strategies work to gain public
approval for the organization while mortification strategies hope to win forgiveness of
publics and acceptance of the crisis.
The framework proposed by Coombs (1995) is the first time the variables of
crisis type, veracity of evidence, performance history and damage have been brought
together to form crisis response strategy recommendations. The weakness of the
model is that it has not been tested; therefore, the crisis response strategies recom
mended, while intuitively valuable, are yet unproved in their ability to help an organi
zation survive a crisis.
Prior to Coomb's (1995) research, Marcus and Goodman (1991) used agency
theory and signaling theory as a framework for their research on the dilemmas of
corporate policy presentation during a crisis. Their research provided quantitative
data which suggests that the most effective response to a crisis, in the eyes of inves
tors, is denial. The study analyzed accidents, scandals and product safety incidents
and the effects that corporate policy announcements had on investor's responses. The
study classifies announcements as "accommodating" or "defensive" based on the
identification and classification of policy declarations found in the Wall Street Journal.

Marcus and Goodman (1991) provide the only quantitative data that links organiza
tional communication strategies to stakeholder reaction. In this study, however,
stakeholders are limited to investors; therefore, the findings may not be replicable to
other organizational publics. Nevertheless, this research most closely resembles the
framework of this thesis, with the obvious difference being the focus on the broad
public opinion of consumers rather than the narrow interests of investors.
The Corporate Communication Response Model by Bradford and Garrett
(1995) begins to fill the gap in the scholarly literature by drawing a connection
between communication strategies and public opinion research. Their model defines
various corporate responses to unethical behavior allegations and evaluates the
relative effectiveness on third parties perceptions' of the accused organization's
image. The model is based on impression management theory which assumes
individuals determine the cause for an action and base their opinion or image of the
involved party only on the information available (Hastie, 1984; Schlenker, 1980).
Bradford and Garrett's model examines situations in which organizations gave "no
response" and a "corporate response." The path of no response posits that if an
organization does not respond to accusations of wrongdoing, the prevailing negative
information directly and adversely impacts the company's image. Conversely, if an
organization engages in communicative responses, the likelihood of influencing publics
perceptions of an event is enhanced greatly.
Bradford and Garrett (1995) offer five potential communication responses: no
response, denial, excuse, justification and concession. These responses follow the
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communication strategies typically seen in current research (Coombs, 1995; Egelhoff
& Sen, 1992; Gonzalez-Herrero and Pratt, 1995; Marcus and Goodman, 1991;
Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992; Sturges, 1994) The model also incorporates the position
that the selection of communication responses must fit the situation; this line of
research is well documented and supported (Coombs, 1995; Egelhoff & Sen, 1992;
Gonzalez-Herrero and Pratt, 1995; Marcus and Goodman, 1991; Pauchant & Mitroff,
1992; Sturges, 1994). Bradford and Garrett specifically conclude that third party
perceptions of corporate image are negatively impacted if no communication is
offered. In support of this premise, the study also found that the concession response
option generally is received more favorably by third party observers across all situa
tions. This disparity as discussed later, is in direct conflict with Marcus and Goodman
(1991) who states that investors respond most favorably to denial statements.
Bradford and Garrett' model, while useful, is limited in scope; unethical behavior
represents a small segment of current typology research. In addition, the model does
not account for pre-existing opinions about the organization's image which also may
serve as factors in the determination of a communication response strategy.
Once a crisis occurs and an organization responds, minimal information exists
about the impact the chosen communication strategy has on organizational stake
holders. With the exception ofMarcus and Goodman's (1991) research on investor
response, current theories of crisis management have not been tested on other organi
zational publics. An understanding of the role public opinion has in determining the
success or failure of an organization's crisis communication strategy is crucial to

predicting company response during a crisis. Sturges (1994) research of public opin
ion during a crisis serves an entree into the discussion of the effect of crisis communi
cation strategies on public opinion.
The Court of Public Opinion
Since the tum of the century, scholars have drawn a connection between
public opinion and communication (Cooley, 1902). Fifty years hence, Cantril (1948)
published the Laws of Public Opinion in which he outlined the connection between
words, events, and the formation of public opinion. He suggests that the magnitude of
an event coupled with high levels of self-interest influence public opinion and, when
that opinion is unstructured, communication activities can influence its formation.
Cantrils' research was the first to link public opinion to crisis communication and has
served as the basis for much of the recent scholarly research.
A person's attitudes and perceptions are a compilation of "objective" reality
and individual beliefs about the world or a situation (Fields 1971). Glynn (1997,
1984) suggests that public opinion is an "expression of the interaction between an
individual's actual opinions and their perceptions of others' opinions" (p.157). It is
the compilation of opinions that serves as the conduit from individual to group or
public opinions. Communication is central to the formation of public opinion; it serves
as the primary vehicle in the development and maintenance of public opinion. As the
size of an organization's public increases, public opinion is maintained through com
munication activities (Glynn, 1997). Accordingly, mass communication, by its very
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nature, develops, modifies and maintains public opinion (Davidson, 1975).
Sturges, Carrell, Newsom and Barrera (1991) further develop the link between
public opinion formation and communication with a focus on the implications for crisis
communication management. They contend that the objective of crisis management is
to "influence public opinion to the point that post-crisis opinions of any constituent
audience are at least as positive, or more positive, or not more negative, than before
hand" (p. 23). The establishment of a group or social norm is a strong factor in the
development of individual opinion (Glynn, 1997; Sturges, et. al, 1991). Consequently,
as individuals interact, the outward expressions of these opinions result in the forma
tion of a group opinion which subsequently guides behavior (Hart and Scott, 1975).
Organizations in crises choose communication strategies that simultaneously
Q!Otect the organization and positively influence public opinion._Otherwise, the con
sequences of negative public opinion include reputation damage and fluctuations in
stock performance and profits. It is clear that it is easier to modify opinions before
they are solidified by an event and corresponding communication activities (Cantril,
1947; Sturges, et. al, 1991). Once opinions are formed they become an individual's
social reality and are more difficult to change (Glynn, 1997; White, 1987).
The current literature provides a theoretical base that links public opinion to
crisis communication. It does not, however, quantitatively demonstrate the effects of
rhetorical strategies on public opinion or link those strategies to long term reputation
damage. Case studies serve as an excellent tool as a basis for the aforementioned
analysis. This thesis analyzes eight cases and provide quantitative data linking public

28
opinion to crisis communication.
Case Studies
NASA's Challenger
On January 28, 1986, the space shuttle Challenger exploded, killing all seven
astronauts aboard. Approximately 2,500 persons watched the launch at Cape
Canaveral while millions more witnessed the explosion on live television broadcasts.
The image of the Challenger disaster was indelibly printed on the national conscious
ness from that day forward (Romzek & Dubnick, 1987; Seeger, 1986; Vaughn, 1996).
The Challenger mission was to serve as a symbol of the union between space explora
tion and the future of education, and to highlight the inclusion of civilians in the space
program (Seeger, 1986). The New York Times reported the mission would be a public
relations windfall for NASA by inspiring the imagination of the nation's children
(Mister, 1986). Instead, the highly successful American space shuttle program ended
73 seconds after launch in a fiery explosion and with it the infallible reputation and
publics trust ofNASA (Gourna, Hirokawa & Martz, 1986; Moore, 1992; Vaughn,
1996).
Americans and NASA had grown increasingly complacent about the space
shuttle program. With the obvious exception of the Challenger, all of the previous
shuttle voyages had been successful. This sense of complacency and confidence
increased the likelihood of a disaster and the dramatic public reaction of shock and
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anger that occurred (Vaughn, 1996).
As the Challenger exploded so did NASA's reputation. Concerns for contin
ued governmental funding and public support for the space program immediately came
to the foreground. As NASA struggled to make sense of the tragedy, it became
engaged in a public relations fight for its life.
Prior to the launch, NASA was susceptible to decision-making dominated by
public opinion (Starbuck & Milliken 1988; Vaughn, 1996). Due to pressure from
Congress, the media and its employees, NASA felt unable to postpone the Challenger
launch for a second time. In the weeks prior to the fatal launch, the press criticized
NASA. Unfavorable news reports, such as those that occurred on CBS Evening News
which criticized: "Yet another costly, red-faces-all-around space shuttle launch delay,"
(Moore, 1992, p. 277) and ABC World News Tonight which intoned: "Once again a
flawless liftoff proved to be too much of a challenge for the Challenger" (Moore,
1992, p. 277) increased the public's discontent and the impatience ofNASA officials.
Ingantius' (1986) critique ofNASA condemns the agency for being influenced too
much by public opinion:
NASA officials, of course, should be immune from such petty anxieties and
pressures. They should have the strength of character to ignore what the news
media--or anyone else--have to say about launching a spacecraft. They should
ignore public opinion. (20)
After the Challenger explosion, it seemed NASA officials had heeded Ignatius' criti
cism, albeit at the wrong time. Immediately following the accident, NASA seized all
information that related to the Challenger and for a time stonewalled all inquiries
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(Gouran, Hirokawa & Martz, 1986; Mister, 1986; Moore, 1992; Romzek & Dubnick,
1987; Rowland, 1986; Seeger, 1986; Vaughn, 1996). When the Presidential Commis
sion began, it too conducted hearings behind closed doors. These actions further
eroded NASA's reputation and increased the likelihood oflong-term reputation
damage.
To reduce public criticism about the investigation, the hearings ultimately were
opened to the public and news media; however, this did not minimize the problems for
NASA. /Accounts that Morton Thiokol, the engineering firm that designed the shuttle,
personnel was opposed to the launch and recommended it be postponed began to
surface (Gouran, Hirokawa & Martz, 1986; Mister, 1986; Moore, 1992; Romzek &
Dubnick, 1987; Rowland, 1986; Seeger, 1986; Vaughn, 1996). To compound the
problem further, accounts surfaced that the recommendation was not well received by
NASA officials who stated they were "appalled" by the suggestion (Gouran,
Hirokawa & Martz, 1986; Mister, 1986; Moore, 1992; Rornzek & Dubnick, 1987;
Rowland, 1986; Seeger, 1986; Vaughn, 1996). In deference to NASA, Thiokol managers exerted what was termed by the engineers as "pressure" to change their recom
mendation (Gouran, Hirokawa & Martz, 1986; Vaughn, 1996). When it became clear
that NASA had warnings about a possible explosion, NASA turned defensive and

(

placed blame on outside sources which included Morton Thiokol, the media and
Congress. Theoretically, this is correct; however, NASA agreed to an overly ambi
tious launch schedule and ultimately the failure ofits own internal communication
system led to the Challenger explosion (Browning, 1989; Gouran, Hirokawa & Martz,
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1986; Mister, 1986; Moore, 1992; Romzek & Dubnick, 1987; Rowland, 1986;
Seeger, 1986; Vaughn, 1996).
The NASA Challenger explosion is not alone in its magnitude or the effect it
had on public opinion and how the organization chose to respond to the crisis. It
shares similarities with the Exxon Valdez that provide a valuable connection between
what on the surface appears to be vastly different crises. Organizations, such as
NASA and Exxon, operate in environments that are characterized by high risk/low
probability crisis occurrences. This environment has the potential to breed the malaise
that was characteristic of the one suffered by NASA Exxon, too, became comforta
ble and did not effectively plan for a crisis or completely recognize the public outcry
that a disaster, such as the spill in Prince William Sound, would create.
Exxon Valdez
The release of 11 million allons of oil into Prince William Sound on March
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24, 1989, triggered a massive public outcry that challenged Exxon and CEO Lawrence

r--.
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Rawl to provide a corporate response reflective of public sentiment. The challenge
proved insurmountable; the organization could not counter the poignant images of

otters covered in oil and countless dead fish on oil soaked beaches. Initially, Exxon
responded with silence, then an apologia, and finally resorted to defensive signals.
Defined in many scholarly journals, such as Management Communication Quarterly
(August, 1997), and Public Relations Review (Spring, 1991), as what not to do in a
crisis Exxon's communication strategies did nothing to minimize damage to its
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reputation and did little to explain how a spill of such magnitude could be allowed to
occur.
Historically, Exxon maintained a low-profile in the media (Small, 1991; Tyler,
1997; Yagoda, 1990). Its overall economic success did not rely on advertising and
marketing; in fact, Exxon could be considered benign in the sense that the company
had little direct significance to consumers--unless of course a spill occurred or there
was an oil embargo. It is precisely this lack of media and public relations savvy that
resulted in Exxon's communication catastrophe. Rawl later admitted to such prob
lems, "You ought to always have a public affairs plan, even though it's kind of hard to
force yourself to think in terms of a chemical plant blowing up or spilling all that oil in
Prince William Sound" (Fortune. "In Ten Years," p. 54).
As Rawl discussed, Exxon did not have a crisis management plan; thus, the
response to the spill resembled that of a child learning to swim; lots of splashes but no
meaningful progress. Initially, Exxon did nothing to ease the growing public rage
about the Valdez; officials were silent. Six days passed before Rawl made his first
public comments and by that time the media, fishermen, environmentalists and other
interested groups had defined the crisis for the public. This is in direct contrast to
what crisis management manuals teach: have a spokesperson to tell your side of the
story (Benson, 1988; Coombs, 1995; Guth, 1995; Mitroff, 1988; Patterson, 1993).
After ten heated days, Exxon's CEO Rawl penned an apologia advertisement
that ran in several national newspapers and magazines. The apologia stated:
We believe that Exxon has moved swiftly and competently to minimize the
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effect this oil will have on the environment, fish and other wildlife. Further, I
hope that you know we have already committed several hundred people to
work on the cleanup. We also will meet our obligations to all those who have
suffered damage from the spill.
Finally, and most importantly, I want to tell you how sorry I am that
this accident took place. We at Exxon are especially sympathetic to the
residents of Valdez and the people of the State of Alaska. We cannot, of
course, undo what has been done. But I can assure you that since March 24,
the accident has been receiving our full attention and will continue to do so.
(New York Times, April 5, 1989)
Critics of Exxon's apologia, including environmentalists, Alaskans, and national
politicians, contend that it came too late and did not adequately accept responsibility
for the accident (Hearit, 1996). After ten days of definitional hegemony by the media
and environmentalists, it would not have mattered what type of statement Exxon made
for the damage had been done.
When the attacks continued even after the apologia, Exxon became even more
defensive. As Exxon scrambled to salvage its reputation, it tried to portray itself as a
victim of circumstance. By characterizing the spill as an unpreventable accident and
placing blame on Captain Hazelwood, the state of Alaska and the Coast Guard, Exxon
further damaged its position with the public (Hearit, 1996). In fairness to CEO Rawl,
he is an engineer by trade. He was not trained nor had a desire to be Exxon's spokes
person; his comments woefully reflect those sentiments. Similar to NASA engineers
who were dumbfounded by the public shock over a technological failure, Rawl did not
understand how the public would respond to his straightforward comments and was
annoyed when he was called arrogant:
Let's talk about the word arrogance. Last year customers boycotted us and
cut up 40,000 credit cards. But, on average, those cards weren't being used
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much, while many other customers ordered more than 160,000 cards in that
same time period ... We said we would do all we could after the Alaska spill:
we took responsibility, we spent over $2 billion, and we gave Alaska fishermew
$�Qmjllimt.on no more than their sh�wing us a fishing licen� and last year's
tax return. And we're 'arrogant'. That bothers the hell out ofme. Maybe
'big' is just arrogant. Or maybe I get emotional and that's arrogant. Or
maybe I say things people don't like to hear. Is that arrogance? You tell me.
(Time, March 26, 1990)
The comments by CEO Rawl illustrate his inexperience with public relations
and his lack ofconsideration to the effect his comments had on public opinion. If
Exxon was judged solely by its post-crisis actions not rhetorical responses, it would
have been applauded. Yet, while the Exxon Valdez was not the worst oil spill in
history (internationally, it was preceded by spills in excess of183 million gallons), it

--....:__.

has become the most expensive to clean-up, both in terms ofthe environmental
damage in Alaska and the reputation damage to Exxon and the oil industry (Small,
1991).
When companies such as Exxon and NASA face such horrific crisis, they are
surprisingly ill-prepared. Large industries in particular find themselves either spread
too thin, due to the number ofglobal operations they have, or the organization does
not want to acknowledge that crises occur regardless ofthe industry, the personnel
and the best intentions to avoid such an event. Perhaps the most poignant example of
this is Three Mile Island.
Three Mile Island
Before sunrise on March 28, 1978, a roar ofsteam signaled the beginning of
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the worst nuclear accident ever to happen in the twenty-five year history of the civilian
nuclear power program. Ground zero: Three Mile Island Unit Two. Owned and
operated by the Metropolitan Edison Company, a subsidiary of General Public
Utilities, Three Mile Island is encircled by several small towns and borders on the
major metropolitan area of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania (Dionisopoulous & Crable, 1988;
Hyde, 1979; McKee, 1990).
As the roar of steam signaled to plant personnel something was wrong, the
control panel became a virtual light show accompanied by alarms that registered the
severity of the situation. It quickly became apparent that this was not an incident for
which anyone on staff had been adequately prepared. In fact, Three Mile Island
personnel and the American public had been led to believe a nuclear power accident of
this proportion "couldn't and wouldn't happen" (McKee, 1990, p. 16).
The technical nature of Three Mile Island complicated the communication
choices for its officials. Furthermore, due to the nature of the nuclear business there
was no clear authority to lead the crisis team. In fact, people were so fragmented that
in the early hours of the crisis, the only person on site to answer questions was a tour
guide (McKee, 1990). Similar to the Challenger explosion, Three Mile Island officials
were too busy trying to contain the crisis and assess its impact on humans and the
environment to respond effectively to the media. Further, they had little training in
media relations and tended to give highly technical answers (Hyde, 1979; McKee,
1990; Yates, 1990) This led to a variety of sources, at multiple locations, who
provided different interpretations of a crisis that was in constant flux (Hyde, 1979).
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When crises strike far from the corporate headquarters or in arenas not easily
interpreted to the general public; a crescendo of fear is often an organization's worst
enemy. Three Mile Island officials struggled with the development of communication
strategies that adequately represented the interests of engineers, environmentalists,
politicians, citizens and governmental agencies. During the formation phase of these
strategies, which took a full week to develop, Three Mile Island did not win the sup
port of its publics (Hyde, 1979; McKee, 1990). Unlike Three Mile Island, recognition
of that fear and a response that demonstrated was utilized by Union Carbide in the
aftermath of the Bhopal crisis.
Union Carbide
On December 2, 1984, Union Carbide was forced to face the reality that its
plant in Bhopal, India had leaked a highly toxic gas, methyl isocyanate (MIC), into the
air that literally thousands oflndians breathed. This chemical leak resulted in a death
toll of over 3,000 and over 200,000 major injuries (Kirkland, 1985; Mitroff, 1994; Sen
& Engelhoff, 1991; Wood, 1994). Similar to the Exxon Valdez, the horrific images of
how the victims died compounded the crises. Fortune magazine described the Indians
who died as: "scurrying madly in the dark, twitching and writhing like the insects for
who the poison was intended" (p. 51). It was this image coupled with an innate fear
in humans of something they cannot hear, see, taste or smell being their killer that
helped propel Union Carbide into the headlines.
The company and its officials responded quickly and communicated high levels
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of concern for the victims (Wood, 1994). The statements by Union Carbide officials
often took on a personal tone and seemed distinctly different from the statements
made by other organizations which faced accidents of similar magnitude. Edward Van
Den Ameele, Union Carbide Manager of press relations and the first person to learn of
the leak, described the situation: "And it (the death toll) just kept going up and up
and up ...It felt like I was in a continuous long-running nightmare only I wasn't
asleep" (Eortune, January 7, 1985, p. 51). Chairman Warren Anderson was even
more emotional. When asked about his plans for moving Union Carbide past the
crisis, he answered "I do worry about that once in a while" and professed himself
personally "shattered" by the events in Bhopal (Fortune, January 7, 1985, p.53). So
shattered in fact, he made a textbook error of immediately going to Bhopal only to
find himself, a key member of the crisis response team, arrested immediately
(Kirkland, 1985; Mitroff, 1994; Sen & Engelhoff, 1991; Wood, 1994). The error was
the fact that temporarily he was unable to assist his company and, therefore, the
victims of Bhopal. The silver lining, however, was the impression that his trip and
subsequent arrest made on various publics: A chairman who was deeply concerned
about the victims more so than his own safety.
Union Carbide's actions in the days after the chemical leak were indicative of
an organization that recognizes the multiple publics it must address during a crisis.
Immediately, medical supplies, respirators and doctors were sent to India to assist
victims. Technical experts were commissioned to examine the plant and the Indian
government one million dollars of immediate aid which it promptly declined. Perhaps
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more significant was Union Carbide's decision to immediately halt production of
methyl isocyanate at the company's West Virginia plant and reduce stock of the gas at
all other facilities (Kirkland, 1985; Mitroff, 1994; Sen & Engelhoff, 1991; Wood,
1994). Finally, company officials held regular press briefings that one company
official described as occasions in which "we basically came forward to express our
sympathy and share with everyone all the information we didn't know" (Fortune,
January 7, 1985, p.52).
Union Carbide's actions and statements in response to the gas leak at Bhopal
were accommodative. This strategy is unique to most organizations that face crises,
especially in situations such as Bhopal and Prince William Sound in which the crisis
brings attention to the entire industry. In the Bhopal case, the only defensive
statement came from Dan Bishop, Director of Environmental Communication at
Monsanto: "You might have thought about something like this happening as a result
of a massive explosion ...this was unthinkable until it happened" (Fortune, January
7, 1985, p. 52).
� �hink the unthinkable is perhaps an organization's best strategy in planning
for crises. In all four cases, NASA's Challenger, Exxon's Valdez, Three Mile Island
and Union Carbide Bhopal, no one had adequately, if at all, prepared for the unthink
able. In product safety incidents, the unimaginable often is closer than many execu
tives believe. The current climate of class action lawsuits and consumer advocacy
should alert organizations to the reality that crises do happen and occur with increas
ing frequency.
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Procter and Gamble's Rely Tampons
On September 17, 1980, six years after Rely tampons entered the marketplace,
The New York Times reported that the Government Center for Disease Control (CDC)

in Atlanta announced a link between Rely tampons and toxic shock syndrome (TSS).
The accusations came on the heels ofRely's national roll-out and found Procter and
Gamble in the position of having to defend its product to the 50 million American
women who use tampons annually (Mitroff & Kilman, 1993; Weinberfer & Romeo,
1989).
Initially, Procter and Gamble challenged the validity of the CDC's study,
claimed the test was "too limited and fragmentary for any conclusions to be drawn"
(The New York Times, September 18, 1980, p. C3). Two days later, the company
announced a temporary halt in production ofRely tampons. Company officials issued
the following statement:
The FDA has indicated that it may be requiring a label change for Rely and
other tampons. Hence, we are temporarily suspending manufacturing opera
tions until the question is resolved. (The New York Times, September 20,
1980, p. Al 7)
This statement is defensive. At this point in time, Procter and Gamble is laying blame
on the testing procedures and the FDA None of the statements issued discuss the
product and its apparent link to toxic shock syndrome. Even as the company
announced the first product recall in its history, officials staunchly defend the product,
its testing procedures and the existence of toxic shock syndrome regardless ofRely's
presence in the marketplace. Edward Harness, Chairman of Procter and Gamble,
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announced a product recall and sales suspension were ordered "despite the fact that
we know of no defect in theRely tampon and despite evidence that the withdrawal of
Rely will not eliminate the occurrence of toxic shock syndrome even ifRely's use is
completely discontinued"(The New York Times,R. Severo, September23, 1980, p.

Al)
The299 reported cases of toxic shock syndrome between 1975 and 1980
resulted in the deaths of25 women (Weinberger &Romeo, 1989). The CDC
estimated that seventy-one percent of the cases were associated withRely tampons.
This connection coupled with public outcry resulted in the product recall and cost
Procter and Gamble $75 million after taxes, not including lost sales (Mitroff &
Kilman, 1993; Weinberfer & Romeo, 1989).
For many organizations involved in product-safety incidents the goal is to
move the issues "off the front page." Procter and Gamble employed this strategy with
Rely. However, some organizations find themselves compelled to fight their case in
the court of public opinion with the media as a vehicle to disseminate their positions.
Suzuki Samurai
On June 3, 1988, ConsumerReports asks the Federal Government to recall the
Suzuki Samurai (The New York Times, Levin, p. Al). The magazine claimed the
four wheel drive vehicle was prone to roll-over if maneuvered quickly and that the
problem was inherent in the design, therefore not easily corrected. By this time, over
150,000 Samurai's were on the road. Similar to Procter and Gamble's early strategy,
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Suzuki criticized the Consumer Reports test as "not representative ofactual driving
conditions" and Doug Mazza, Vice President ofAmerican Suzuki, issued the follow
ing statement:
The Samurai was thoroughly tested for safety, including stability and handling
prior to its introduction into the United States. We have absolute confidence
we are selling a safe and stable vehicle. ("Con.sumers Union Calls," 1988, June
3, The New York Times, p. D4).
At the same time that Suzuki proclaimed the Samurai "safe and stable," the Center for
Auto Safety made an official recall complaint to the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration which alleged that the four wheel drive vehicle was responsible for 41
roll-over accidents that resulted in 16 deaths and 53 injuries. Again, Suzuki
responded defensively with the threat ofa lawsuit ifthe Center continued with its
recall request ("Test Change Draws Fire," 1988, June 10, The New York Times).
The threat oflegal action pales in comparison to the trump card Suzuki played
in its defense. On June 3, 1988, when Consumer Reports asked for the recall ofthe
Samurai, Suzuki officials released the following statement:
We believe Suzuki is the target ofcriticism because the Samurai is the leading
imported sport utility vehicle from Japan and has gained tremendous media
attention due to its unique styling, reliability and affordable price (The New
York Times, Levin, June 3, 1988, p. D4)
The quotation is significant since the late 1980's saw an increased level of"Japan
bashing" in the United States; thus, Suzuki attempted to change the definition ofthe
crises from the Samurai and its tendency to roll-over to the United States unfair
treatment ofproducts from Japan.
On September 2, 1988, The New York Times reported that the Federal
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Government would not issue a recall of the Samurai. However, the negative publicity
had made an impact on Suzuki Samurai sales and perhaps more alarming were the
seven states that brought suit against the company for misleading advertisements and
promotional activities (The New York Times, March 24,1989, Hirsch, p. D5). It was
this situation that resulted in the only accommodative ·statement made by Suzuki in
regard to the Samurai. The warning Suzuki agreed to place in all Samurai advertise
ments read as follows: "This vehicle handles differently from ordinary passenger cars
Federal law cautions to avoid sharp turns and abrupt maneuvers" (The New York
Times, March 24, 1989, Hirsch, p. D5). Suzuki paved the way for other companies
who have chosen to fight claims of unsafe products. Researchers agree (Gates, 1993;
Meyers, 1993; Serwer, 1993) that organizations who vigorously defend their actions,
especially in crises where there is a loss of life, may find public sentiment against them.
General Motors Pick-up Trucks
The General Motors Corporation (GM) decided to fight back against claims
that its large pick-up trucks with side saddle gas tanks manufactured between 1973
and 1987 had a propensity to explode upon impact (Gates, 1993; Hearit, 1996;
Malone, 1996; Meyers, 1993; Serwer, 1993). In doing so, NBC Dateline gave the
company the perfect vehicle to survive a crisis that may otherwise had significant
negative consequences, such as a recall, governmental regulation and consumer
backlash.
On November 17, 1992, NBC Dateline aired a segment on the GM pick-up
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trucks which showed a truck upon impact become an instantaneous pyre (Gates,
1993; Hearit, 1996; Malone, 1996; Meyers, 1993; Serwer, 1993). Eleven million
people watched the segment only three months before an Atlanta jury awarded the
parents of Shannon Mosely, a 17 year-old who died in a GM side impact truck explo
sion, a record $105.2 million judgment (Malone, 1996; Meyers, 1993; Serwer, 1993).
Significant was the fact that the jury gave the Moselys more than the defense had
requested; subsequent interviews with the jurors indicate an anger over GM's lack of
repentance in regard to the pick-up trucks (Serwer, 1993).
Six days after the verdict GM shows the jury exactly how unrepentant it was.
GM's spokesperson, William O'Neill told the Wall Street Journal, "Our position is
that we have done nothing wrong" (February 8, 1993, p.D2). And the next day, GM
legal counsel Pearce said "Are we to redesign all our vehicles based on a single jury
verdict?" (Wall Street Journal, February 9, 1993, p. A2). These statements coincided
with GM's lawsuit against NBC for defamation. The lawsuit had merit since GM
could prove that NBC had rigged the pick-up truck to explode. The very next day,
NBC Dateline apologized, for a record three and one half minutes, on the air (Hearit,
1996).
GM continued its defensive posture in relation to the full-size pick-up truck
accusations. In January, 1995, the U.S. Department of Transportation dropped its
investigation of the 1973-1987 trucks; it cited that it could not win the court battle the
automaker intended to wage (Ward's Auto World, Jan. 1995, p. 22) Throughout the
crisis, GM did not offer one accommodative statement; rather issued defensive
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statements whenever feasible. The automaker did, however, agree to pay $51.355
million for safety research and another $39 million for child safety seats, educational
programs, a fire safety lab, bum and trauma treatment and a computer program for
accidents and injuries (Ward's Auto World, Jan. 1995, p. 22) Interestingly, for all its
media savvy in its defense of the pick-up trucks, GM did not publicize the aforemen
tioned agreement and released no information as to why the organization agreed to the
settlement.
In product-safety incidents such as those experienced by General Motors and
Suzuki, the company is in control of product design and manufacturing. It is the
organization's responsibility to meet the safety guidelines set forth for the industry.
These guidelines exist to protect consumers and ensure a minimum quality standard is
maintained. A case in which a fast food restaurant failed to meet such standards
illustrates the peril company's face when such a failure results in public harm.
Jack-in-the-Box
The 1,231 Jack-in-the-Box units nationwide are owned by Foodmaker, Inc.
(Brooks, 1994). As with all fast-food restaurants, Jack-in-the-Box is required by law
to cook its hamburgers to minimum temperature of 140 degrees to effectively
eliminate bacteria such as E-coli. On January 3, 1993, it became clear that in some
units this guideline was not being followed; health officials reported 400 victims ofE
coli poisoning in Washington state (Brooks, 1994; Little, 1997; Martin, 1995; Soeder,
1993). Fifteen days later the link was evident between the poisonings and Jack-in-the-
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Box restaurants in the Seattle area. The company responded with the destruction of
20,000 pounds of possibly contaminated meat, selected new meat suppliers, estab
lished a toll-free complaint number, and increased cooking temperatures (Brooks,
1994; Soeder, 1993; Theno, 1997). The quick response, however, became stunted
when on January 22, Michael Cole, a two year old died. He was the first of four
children who died from E-coli contamination. As with many crises, the image of his
death was nearly impossible for the organization to minimize (Brooks, 1994; Soeder,
1993).
On February 1, 1993, one month after the outbreak began, Jack-in-the-Box
issued its first statement. Jack-in-the-Box President, Robert Nugent, announced the
organization would pay for all hospitalization costs of victims: "We are committed to
meeting all of our responsibilities in connection with this devastating situation. If
people need our help with hospital costs, we want to give it immediately with no
strings attached" (Soeder, 1993, p. 35). This accommodative statement coincided
with defensive statements that blamed meat suppliers for the contamination and criti
cized state health officials for not informing the company about the need for higher
preparation temperatures (Brooks, 1994; Soeder, 1993).
Jack-in-the-Box and its parent company, Foodmaker, Inc., ultimately withdrew
its accusations against the meat suppliers and state health officials. Their statements,
albeit few and far between, were accommodative in nature (Brooks, 1991; Liddle,
1997; Soeder, 1993). Within six months, the chain had begun to recover. The recov
ery evolved from aggressive marketing and public relations activities that included

price promotions, advertisements that explained how the contamination occurred, and
the promotion of non-beef menu items (Soeder, 1993).
Summary
Each of the crises analyzed in this thesis have unique characteristics. How
ever, the modality chosen to respond to crises is remarkably similar. Whether defen
sive or accommodative, all the organizations were in a position to account for their
actions. This is a difficult task in good times and, as the cases illustrate, in times of
crises the statements chosen have an impact on organizational reputation and how the
crisis is reported by the media. Next, Chapter III will discuss the methodology this
thesis will use to test the four hypotheses in order to determine the relationship
between communication strategy and public perception of an organization's image.
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CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY
The ability to assess the impact ofa crisis on an organization and its image is
an integral part ofcrisis management research. When the Valdez began spewing oil
into Prince William Sound, the Exxon Corporation faced not only an environmental
but an image crisis as well. Communication activities served a larger purpose than
information distribution; rather, when and how the organization reacted, the language
it used, and the subsequent response from its publics laid the groundwork for Exxon's
ability to survive the crisis. This thesis proposes that organizations that are cognizant
ofthe link between crisis communication activities and public opinion will experience
fewer negative consequences from the crisis. Subsequently, this chapter details
methodologically how the relationship between crisis communication and public
opinion will be assessed.
Researchers primarily have focused on rhetorical analysis in understanding the
role ofcommunication in crisis management (Barton, 1991; Coombs, 199 5; Hearit,
1996; Mister, 1986; Seeger, 1998; Seeger, 1986). This line ofresearch is a valuable
tool to understand how organizations communicate during crises; yet it is source_centered: it--Gatalogu�s the str:at�gies.. .us�d by corporate persuaders. It cannot quan
titatively address the efficacy ofthese strategies and their requisite effect on public
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op1ruon. One exception to this direction of crisis research is found in the program
of study undertaken by Coombs and Holladay (1996) who explore how crisis type,
organizational performance and communicative response are associated with the
image of an organization. The Coombs and Holladay approach is complimented by
the work of Marcus and Goodman (1991), who focus on �nvestor response to policy

·--------

declarations made by an organization during a crisis: this provides an assessment of a
-

different, albeit, equally important public to an organization: its stockholders. While
different in locus, both lines of study are valuable to understanding the connection
between crisis communication strategies and public opinion; therefore, this thesis will
combine the two research approaches to investigate the hypotheses presented in
Chapter I:
Hl: If accommodative statements are offered in response to a crisis, public
opinion of the organization's image will be more positive than if defensive statements
are given.
H2: If defensive statements are offered in response to a crisis, public opinion
of the organization's image will be more negative than if accommodative statements
are given.
Overview
In order to test these hypotheses, this study will first revisit the crises surveyed
and categorized in Chapter II as product safety incidents or accidents. Next, policy
declarations obtained from The New York Times will be coded as either
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accommodative or defensive in content. The purpose of the coding is to provide a
content analysis framework for use in the survey instrument. After coding, the
statements will be incorporated into a survey to be administered to undergraduate and
graduate Communication students at a large Midwestern University.
The survey in question will be a nineteen question instrument that uses a five
point scale anchored by strongly agree and strongly disagree. Participants will
respond to questions about organizational trustworthiness, responsibility and future
involvement. Finally, several statistical analyses are to be performed to determine the
relationship between crisis communication activities and organizational image.
Specifically, a 1 x 3 design is used to determine the significance of the relationship
between the independent variables; accommodative, defensive and control surveys;
and the dependent variable, organizational image, in each individual case study. It is
the intent of this thesis to test the idea that organizations that take a conciliatory
approach in their crisis management will be viewed more favorably by auditors of
organizational messages than those who take a defensive stance.
Statement Identification and Classification
This study relies on the accurate coding of the statements issued by the organi
zation during the crisis. The statements provide the basis for the survey design that
requires respondents to answer questions about organizational image. Specifically,
the statements each organization made, respective to the individual crisis, will be
coded as accommodative or defensive. This coding serves as the basis for the survey
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and the final determination of the relationship between crisis communication and
organizational image. The framework used for statement classification is Marcus and
Goodman's (1991) systematic approach to policy declaration classification.
The Marcus and Goodman study examined the Wall Street Journal for policy
declarations due to its focus on investor responses to policy declarations. Due to this
study's focus on public opinion, as opposed to investor response, it uses policy declar
ations from The New York Times, a recognized national newspaper of record (Lacey
& Llewllyn, 1995). It is reasonable to assume that policy declarations noted in The

New York Times are representative of other media reports. Due to the nature of the
accidents analyzed, the following criteria was established to provide a contextual
timeframe defined by media placement in relation to immediacy and relevancy. The
policy declaration analyzed will meet the following criteria: (a) they are attributable to
an organizational spokesperson; (b) they provide new information about the accident
and address the specific crisis being studied; and (c) the statements are limited to those
appearing in front page articles within the first two weeks after the crisis occurred.
The corporate communication statements will be reviewed and classified as
either accommodative or defensive to provide a basis of distinction for use in the
survey. Accommodative statements are operationalized as those in which managers
accept responsibility, admit to the existence of problems, and attempt to fix the
situation (Marcus & Goodman, 1991). Such statements include apologies, expres
sions of guilt, remorse, and the intent to make restitution. Examples of accommo
dative statements include: "We have done an excellent job of ferreting out the
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weaknesses," and "We feel very badly about the damage to the environment."
Conversely, defensive statements are characterized by the denial of a problem, the
assignment of blame for the incident, the movement to resume normal business oper
ations, and attempts to alleviate any public doubt about company solvency (Marcus &
Goodman, 1991). Statements such as the following ar·e defensive in nature: "There is
no intent to cover up and keep things quiet" and "I don't want to point fingers but the
facts are we're getting a bad rap on that delay."
Coding will be done by two graduate students in Communication, who will
receive training to code the statements. The coders will be told which organization is
attributable to each set of statements. Statements will be identified by the coders on
individual index cards and coded in separate codebooks. In accordance with Marcus
and Goodman (1991), if the coders do not agree on the classification of a particular
statement, the primary researcher will determine the announcement's classification.
[The establishment of the aforementioned criteria resulted in a reduction of the
number of cases that will be tested. Originally, all eight cases reviewed in Chapter II
were to be included in the survey design; however, upon closer examination of the
cases and the corresponding communication activities, it became clear that not all the
cases could be compared consistently. Specifically, the coding of the product safety
incidents did not provide an adequate number of statements by which to gauge public
opinion response. Furthermore, policy declarations were repetitive in context and did
not appear in front page articles. Two of the accidents posed similar problems; the
Three Mile Island case was deemed too far removed from respondents frame of
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reference and the Union Carbide accident resulted in limited policy declarations and
sporadic media coverage which limit the availability of corporate communication
statements. Therefore, in its final form, two cases were chosen for study: the NASA
Challenger and the Exxon Valdez. These two accidents represented cases of which
the survey population would have some knowledge, received similar levels of media
coverage, and provided both accommodative and defensive statements for analysis.]
Survey Design
After the statements are coded, the second step of this study consists of the
application of a survey to test the current perception of the image of NASA and
Exxon. The survey design follows the schema developed and tested by Coombs and
Holladay (1996) who explored how crisis type, organizational performance history
and crisis response are associated with the image of an organization. The Coombs and
Holladay (1996) design utilizes nineteen statements which they developed based on
McCroskey' s (1966) measure of character in order to assess corporate image percep
tions. Respondents to the Coombs and Holladay survey typically are asked to answer
the questions based on a fictitious scenario and corresponding corporate statements.
Responses are recorded on a five-point scale that ranges from I (strongly disagree) to
5 (strongly agree).
Two distinctions exist between the Coombs and Holladay survey and the
instrument used in this study. First, Coombs and Holladay focus on the symbolic
approach to crisis management and include the manipulation of three factors: crisis
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type, performance history and crisis response strategy. This instrument examines a
single crisis typology, accidents, in relation to accommodative or defensive communi
cation strategies to assess their effect on organizational image. Second, the Coombs
and Holladay instrument relies on fictitious scenarios and corporate statements.
Conversely, the respondents to this study's survey will respond to questions about
existing organizations, the NASA Challenger and Exxon Valdez, and the actual state
ments given by organizational representatives.
In order to ascertain pre-existing opinions and their subsequent effect on the
participants perception of organizational image, this study asks each participant to
respond to two surveys. The initial control survey features a brief explanation of the
crisis followed by items from the Coombs and Holladay questionnaire. Next, each
participant will be asked to respond to a survey that features the same explanation of
the crisis as in the control survey followed by eight accommodative or defensive state
ments. The respondents are then asked to complete the survey based on these state
ments.
The inclusion of control surveys in this study is a significant departure from
current research. The incorporation of actual case studies, in comparison with the
fictitious cases used in current research, demands that a measure be established to
control for existing bias and opinions of the respondents. In addition, the control
survey provides a means to begin the discussion of crisis lifecycle as it relates to the
lifespan of a crisis in the minds of the public. To further eliminate bias or inequalities
in the data presented, the accommodative and defensive statements were chosen based
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on the clarity of the statement and content to provide comparable comparison
between the surveys.
Statistical Analysis
The overall goal of this study is to determine the relationship between crisis
communication and public opinion. Specifically, data about existing public opinion,
the role of respondent age in response to the survey and the difference between
accommodative and defensive statements on public opinion will be gathered and dis
cussed in relation to public opinion and crisis communication.
Several statistical analysis will be performed to yield answers to the aforemen
tioned hypotheses. First, independent sample t tests will be used to examine the differ
ences between the accommodative response surveys to the defensive response instru
ments (Williams, 1992). The independent sample t test will provide comparison data
to determine if the type of statement issued, either accommodative or defensive,
results in a more favorable opinion of organizational image. The survey combinations
will create the following scenarios: accidents/accommodative response and accidents/
defensive response, which then will be compared.
In addition, a linear regression analysis will be performed to determine the
residual effects of participant knowledge about the crisis (Williams, 1992). Specific
ally, the control surveys, the predictor variable, will be analyzed and compared to the
statement survey of each participant in order to ascertain pre-existing opinions and
their subsequent effect on the participants' perception of organizational image. An

55
evaluation of a respondents' score on the control survey will provide indication of
existing opinions and help explain the respondents' score on the survey that contains
organizational statements. Next, to determine the statistical significance of the
correlation between the control survey and the statement survey scores, an F test will
be completed (Williams, 1992). An F test is commonly used by researchers to deter
mine whether the predicted variance is significantly greater than the unpredicted
variance. In accordance with standard academic standards, this study will measure
statistical significance at the .05 level; however, mention will be given to statistics in
the .10 category as well. The inclusion of the .10 statistics will allow for a broader
discussion of the results and perhaps highlight areas for future research.
The dependent variable measured in the instrument is organizational reputa
tion. Following the work of others, this study conceptualizes a corporation's per
ceived image as characterized by four dimensions: honesty, responsibility, concern
and responsiveness (Bradford & Garrett, 1995; Buono and Nichols, 1985; Carroll,
1979; Cox, 1962; McCoy and Atkins, 1989; Sethi and Falbe, 1987; Worcester, 1986).
Accordingly, the nineteen statements developed by Coombs and Holladay (1996) are
utilized in this study to measure organizational reputation. Examples of items include:
"The company is basically honest," "The company is not concerned with the well
being of its publics," and "I do trust the organization to tell the truth about the inci
dent." Responses are recorded on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
Finally, to assess the effectiveness of the instrument, a reliability test will be

56
performed. The Cronbach' s alpha will determine the internal consistency of the
image items tested (Williams, 1992). This will serve as an indicator of ambiguous
questions and test the degree to which the instrument is reliable. The reason for
performing a reliability analysis on the survey is to determine the internal consistency
of the instrument since it has been adapted from the original version with regard to the
case type and statements included. Thus, the reliability test will provide data which
can then be compared to the results of the Coombs and Holladay (1996) study which
yielded an internal consistency of .82 (Cronbach's alpha). This is less than desirable;
therefore, a reliability test will be performed on the survey to ascertain its reliability
when used with actual case studies.
Data Collection
The site of this study is a large Midwestern university on both its main and
branch campuses. Surveys will be distributed in May 1998 to sixty graduate and sixty
undergraduate students in communication classes. Each respondent will complete two
crisis scenarios and the accompanying measures. The scenarios will be paired so that
each respondent receives one control instrument and one instrument with either
accommodative or defensive statements. Each measure will be completed after read
ing each scenario. Respondents will be asked to complete the survey during the first
twenty minutes of a scheduled class period.
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Conclusion
This analysis seeks to answer the question: How does crisis communication
affect public opinion? Having explicated the methodology to answer this question
which involves qualitative and quantitative analysis, the study offers a number of
potential yields. First, it attempts to differentiate between the effect of accommoda
tive and defensive responses to a crisis. Second, this study is of value due to its
attempt to assess the impact of actual corporate statements on public opinion, a link
that historically has not been drawn in the literature. Finally, it offers an analysis that,
due to the nature of the cases chosen, offers the suggestion of a long-term assessment
of the impact of crises on organizational image.

CHAPTERIV
RESULTS
Currently, the development of a quantitative research base for crisis communi
cation is limited. To date, only Coombs and Holladay (1996) have attempted to exa
mine crises in this manner. Part of the problem is the nature of the topic. The issue of
proprietary information, for example, makes it difficult to obtain data on many organ
izations in a timely manner. This, combined with the field's historical connections to
rhetorical study and the relative infancy of crisis management research, has resulted in
a significant disparity between the qualitative and quantitative research studies
available for discussion.
This thesis has attempted to draw from rhetorical theorists who use "real life"
crises and couple that with the rigor of social scientific methods in order to provide
additional quantitative data in regard to "real life" crisis situation. To achieve this
goal, participants were asked to respond to statements issued by two organizations
during a described crisis. Both cases are well known; therefore control surveys were
also incorporated into this study. To understand participant responses, several statis
tical analyses were performed to answer the hypotheses initially posed in Chapter I.
This chapter presents the findings and details the results which address each
hypothesis.
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Demographics
The sample consisted of 103 participants who ranged in age from 17-56. The
reason for the large age range is that surveys were given to both undergraduate and
graduate students in an attempt to ascertain if age was a confounding variable in the
study. As such, undergraduates (n=57) had a mean age of 20, while graduate students
(n=46) had a mean age of 34. The results did not indicate a significant difference in
the age of participants relative to responses in the control and statement situations.
Reliability Analysis
A reliability analysis, using Cronbach's Alpha, of the nineteen item survey
produced an internal consistency of .7538. Based on academic standards, this result is
acceptable, with the minimal acceptance level being at .7. When compared to the
work of Coombs and Holladay (1996), which resulted in an internal consistency of
.82 on only ten of the nineteen items, this is a considerably more solid result since all
nineteen items were included in this study's analysis.
Manipulation Checks
To determine group independence and homogeneity based on the two cases an
independent sample t test was performed. The results indicated statistical significance
(t=4.439, df=91.0, p=.0000) between the two control surveys with the Challenger
control group having a consistently higher score (M=50.37, SD=8.74) than the Exxon
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group (M=42.35, SD=8.37). As expected, the control groups of each case were
viewed differently and independently by respondents.
Next, to assess the residual effects of participant knowledge about the crisis, as
indicated on the control surveys, a correlation coefficient was calculated. Since each
participant was given two different organizational scenarios (i.e., Challenger control
paired with an Exxon response survey), it was important to determine if a relationship
existed between the control response scenario and scenario response survey. As
illustrated in Table 1, the results were insignificant with the exception of the Exxon
control and Challenger accommodative combination (p=.0063). Again, as expected,
participants responded to the surveys independent of one another, with the previously
noted exception.
Test ofHypotheses
To address Hypotheses One and Two, a two-way ANOVA was performed
using crisis scenario type and either accommodative or defensive statements as the
Table 1
Analysis of Variance for Crisis Scenario and Statement
Effect

df

Scenario
Group
Seen. x Group
Error

1
1
1
95

ss
662.9
1422.9
3.075
9050.0

MS
662.9
1422.9
3.075
95.26

F

p

6.96 .0097
14.94 .0002
0.03 .8578
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independent variables and total organizational image score as the dependent variable.
Overall, the analysis ofthe two scenarios showed statistically significant differences
between the NASA Challenger and the Exxon Valdez scenarios (F = 6.96, p .0097).
The NASA Challenger consistently received a better organizational image score in
relation to its crisis communication strategies (M=49.255) than did the Exxon Valdez
(M=42.803). These results indicate that respondents tended to perceive Exxon more
negatively than NASA irrespective ofthe crisis or statement issued.
Next, an analysis was performed on the accommodative and defensive state
ments. The analysis of accommodative versus defensive statements on organizational
image yielded a statistical significance ofF=14.94, p=.0002. Accommodative state
ments were scored more positively (M=49.152) than defensive statements (M =
40.375). Respondents viewed accommodative statements more positively than defen
sive statements in both crisis scenarios presented. Finally, no interaction exists when
crisis scenario and response are analyzed together (F=0.03, p=.8578), thus indicating
an additive effect. Overall, the results ofthe analyses provide support for both
Hypotheses One and Hypotheses Two that posit accommodative statements will result
in a more positive organizational image that defensive statements. Table 2 summar
izes the analyses.
Summary
The yields presented in this chapter provide support for the hypotheses investi
gated in this thesis, thereby bridging the gap between fictitious and reality-based case
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Table 2
Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Control and Scenario Pairings
Variable

M

SD

r

p

Chall. Control
Exxon Aecom.

51.724
43.800

9.953
8.436

-0.287

.1641

Chall. Control
Exxon Defen.

44.142
39.692

12.623
8.209

.2473

.4154

Exxon Control
Chall. Aecom.

46.666
51.142

9.045
7.924

.5031

.0063

Exxon Control
Chall. Defen.

38.346
49.538

8.560
9.630

-0.0366

.8618

s

*

study. The hypotheses tested indicate that organizational image is more positively
influenced by the use of accommodative statements than defensive communication
strategies, regardless of crisis. In addition, the results show that in the control
scenario, respondents rated organizational image in between the scores given for
accommodative and defensive responses.
The research also indicates quantitative support for many of the foundations of
crisis management; specifically the response scenario models presented by Benson
(1988), Coombs (1995), Hearit (1995) and Pearson and Mitroff (1993). This <levelopment begins to open discussion between the theoretical and practical application
areas of the discipline. The final chapter will focus on the discussion of the research
results, review study limitations, and outline implications for future research.

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Crises are a natural by-product of today's tightly coupled organizations. As
such, it becomes necessary for organizations to understand the dynamics of crisis man
agement and how communication activities help shape organizational image. What an
organization says to its publics, and how and when it is said influences the extent of
damage to organizational image. However, crisis communication activities, by defini
tion, pose unique challenges to an organization in regard to image protection, share
holder expectations and long-term organizational solvency. This study has focused on
organizational image from the viewpoint of public opinion and addressed the com
munication activities of two specific crises: the explosion of the NASA Challenger and
the spill of oil by the Exxon Valdez. This study, with its use of case studies and
organizational image survey instruments, represents the first empirical evidence in
support of the different effects specific communication activities have on public
opinion. As such, it addresses the recent challenge to investigate audience responses
to crisis messages and the suggestion that multiple methods be utilized in this pursuit
(Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 1998). The results presented in this thesis allow for in
sight into how organizational image is measured by the general public in the wake of a
crisis and the subsequent communication statements issued by organizational officials.
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Communication Strategies and Public Response
Organizational communication scholars have developed an expansive body of
literature that analyzes various communication strategies in relation to crisis commun
ication. The goal of this research is "to develop communication models and frame
works that inform practice and that help limit and alleviate the damage to both organ
izations and other crisis stakeholders, such as the community, victims and their fami
lies" (Seeger et.al., 1998, p. 245). Accordingly, much of the literature (i.e., apologia)
indicates that the selection of a certain strategy can repair certain relationships while
alienating others (Ice, 1991 ). The development of an empirical research base will
serve to further researchers' knowledge of the outcomes that various strategies
produce.
This study analyzed the effects of two specific communication strategies:
accommodative and defensive statements in two separate crises. The sole focus on
these two statement categories allowed for analysis of crisis communication at a broad
level. While this is a distinctly more expansive categorization than many current
models use, this study sought to test concepts generally before delving into the various
sub-categories of statements. The results consistently indicate that accommodative
statements are viewed more favorably than defensive statements, regardless of crisis
scenario. This finding supports current qualitative research by communication scho
lars which suggests that organizations that employ accommodative as opposed to
defensive communication strategies will survive a crisis more positively (Benson,
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1988; Coombs, 1995; 1996; Hearit, 1994, 1995; Seeger, et. al, 1998). The signif
icance of these findings cannot be underestimated. First, the emergence of data which
illustrates organizational communication activities and the publics responses to the
statements as printed in The New York Times breaks new ground in the field. It is now
possible to cite the Challenger and Valdez as cases in which, regardless of the crisis
magnitude, accommodative statements were viewed more favorably by the respon
dents. This provides insight to practitioners as they determine the direction of their
crisis communication plans. While exploratory in form, this study provides quantita
tive data to understand the impact of various crisis communication strategies. Second,
this analysis strongly suggests that statements directly influence public perception of
organizational image, thereby implying that even in the most severe crisis a possibility
exists to improve or worsen the organization's image through the communication
strategies chosen. Finally, this study serves as a building block for more detailed
analysis of the various rhetorical strategies available to organizations. For example,
within the broad definition of defensive statements there exists specific techniques
such as denial or blaming. The development of more detailed empirical evidence for
specific strategies would help further define this research area.
The inclusion of control surveys allowed for comparisons of the effects of the
statements to be studied. The results of the control groups indicate that when no
statements were provided, the mean scores fell in between the accommodative and
defensive scores. This indicates that there is a distinct difference in participants'
reactions to the scenarios and statements given. Again, this begins to illustrate that
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participants responded progressively, with accommodative receiving the most posi
tive score, defensive the most negative, and the control surveys in between the two
scores. The neutrality ofthe control surveys serves as a barometer for organizational
image to be used to monitor the effects oforganizational statements. The outcomes
from this study are useful tools to understand how an organization can impact, posi
tively and negatively, its image in relation to a crisis. While more research needs to be
done, the difference in participant response to organizational image in relation to
response strategy indicates that the chosen rhetoric ofan organization does impact its
publics and consequently its image.
Image Restoration
The restoration ofa damaged image due to a crisis takes considerable effort.
In both the Challenger and Exxon cases, organizational officials worked feverishly to
disseminate information to influence positively the outcome ofthe crisis. These types
ofactivities are analyzed in research on image restoration that can be classified into
three main genres. All three categories provide detailed explanations ofhow specific
communication strategies can be employed, potential outcomes and relevance to an
organization and its publics. Benoit (1995) has developed a comprehensive body of
work on image restoration that identified five strategies. These strategies (denial,
evasion ofresponsibility, reduction ofthe offensiveness ofthe event, corrective action
and mortification) have been adapted by other researchers and used to evaluate
numerous case studies. Another area ofimage restoration delves in the area of

corporate apologia. Hearit (1994, 1995) suggests that in corporate apologia three
"protypical appearance/reality disassociations" are used by organizations. Specifically,
these types of apologia include efforts to deny guilt, differentiation of guilt by scape
goating, and apologizing. Finally, Coombs (1995) developed a model that incorpor
ates five primary responses and illustrates a linear progression between locus, stability
and response. This is the model tested by Coombs and Holladay (1996) on fictitious
scenarios which serves as the basis for this study.
The aforementioned literature provides detailed accounts of communication
strategies available to organizations during a crisis. While the terminology differs and
the depth and breadth of each classification changes, all can be related back to the
accommodative and defensive categorization utilized in this study. For example,
Benoit's corrective action is accommodative in nature while evasion of responsibility
is defensive. Similarly, Hearit's denial and differentiation are defensive while apologia
is accommodative. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the accommodative
statements in current communication literature would be viewed more favorably than
defensive statements in subsequent studies. It is imperative that the scholarly research
that investigates current theories with quantitative methodology be expanded to
include different crisis scenarios and a more specific classification of communication
responses to increase the relevance of these findings.
Similar to the work by communication scholars, Marcus and Goodman (1991)
analyzed the effects of communication responses on investors. The empirical evidence
presented in the study supports the conclusion that following accidents investors react
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negatively to accommodative signals and positively to defensive signals. This is in
contrast to the results of this study which show public view of organizational image is
more positive after an accident if accommodative statements are offered. These
disparate conclusions provide support for current literature which suggests that the
selection of a particular strategy for one group of stakeholders may have adverse
effects on others (Ice, 1991). Reconciling these disparate conclusions for different
groups is perhaps the central problem of crisis communication research.
In the final analysis, this research illustrates that organizational image is posi
tively influenced by accommodative statements in relation to a given crisis and the
converse holds true for defensive statements. The result trends were the same for
both cases; however, the Challenger consistently scored more positively than the

Valdez. This raises an interesting issue: is an organization, regardless of crisis, limited
in its ability to achieve an overall positive image rating due to the nature of its busi
ness? The results of this study appear to indicate a preliminary answer of yes. While
the crises received the similar amount of media coverage and were relatively close in
time; the Challenger was viewed more favorably by respondents, regardless of
communication strategy. It is, therefore, possible that the nature of the space shuttle
program and its pre-crisis image rating provides a more positive benchmark than that
afforded Exxon. This is supported further by the data since the control surveys did
not, in either case, indicate a confounding variable; consequently, further research
needs to be done to determine the relevancy of this provocative finding.

Limitations
There are several limitations to this study. Perhaps the most significant is also
the study' s greatest strength: the use of actual crises. The use of case studies pro
vides knowledge about how crisis affect "real life" organizations and begins to address
the complexity of an organization in crisis. This is critical to the development of the
crisis communication literature since researchers need to understand the practical
application of various theories. However, there is a plethora of potential confounding
variables that are worthy of discussion. First, only a sample of the statements issued
in each crisis were used in the surveys; thus the information available for participants
was limited. While the statements were representative of the entire body of printed
material on the crisis, each respondent only saw the eight statements presented. In
many crises more than eight statements are given by the organization and these state
ments are provided while other media activity occurs. As such, it is the sum of all
communication activities that influences organizational image from a public opinion
viewpoint. Second, the survey did not assess other variables that may exist such as
political, economic, and environmental factors, and most notably, pre-crisis organiza
tional image. The lack of measurable information about the aforementioned results in
an inability to account for other organizational activities which may be part of the
overall schema. Finally, the crises used in this study occurred nine and twelve years
ago; therefore, respondents' opinions about the organization could have been influ
enced by more recent activities or altered due to the passing of time.
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The study also is limited by the use of college students as survey respon
dents. While this has been minimized to some extent by the inclusion of graduate
students in the sample, it is notable since this population does not serve as a repre
sentative sample of the general public.
Future Research
As the field of crisis management research continues to grow, more quantita
tive studies will result. This study is a first step in the effort to understand what hap
pens to organizational image in the aftermath of a crisis. The incorporation of actual
crises further lends itself to support current theories about the impact communication
strategies of on organizational image during a crisis.
Future research should begin to address the limitations presented in this study.
Specifically, research should be conducted that enables scholars to better understand
the entire organizational dynamics and how crises are impacted by peripheral issues
such as previous organizational image, existing product lines, business climate, envi
ronmental, political and economic factors. This type of research dictates a longitudi
nal study that follows one or more organizations over several years through times of
calm and crisis.
The results of this study also indicate a consistent difference in participants
responses to the NASA Challenger and the Exxon Valdez. In all situations, the
Challenger was viewed more positively than the Valdez. Therefore, future research
could investigate the differences between the nature of the organization (e.g.,
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governmental, non-profit, business), and how publics view the crisis. It is reasonable to assume that the type of industry in which an organization operates will have
some impact on how it is perceived during a crisis; the degree to which this is accurate
would be a valuable tool in understanding crisis implications. Some possible categori
zations include industrial, service, not-for-profit, academic, governmental and tech
nology.
While the crisis models to date have been very effective in lending suggestions
as to how best to respond to a given crisis, one key component is missing. Not all
crises are the same, nor are the organizations that experience a crisis. As such, future
research should begin to develop a model that assigns value to different aspects of an
organization (i.e., current image, product-line, goodwill, employee satisfaction, stock
price), and helps an organization determine the best strategy for its unique situation.
Ideally, this concept would include measurements at the pre-crisis, crisis, and post
crisis stages to assess accurately the impact of the communication strategies chosen.
Currently, this idea is best represented by the symbolic approach (Coombs,
1996). The symbolic approach posits that communication helps shape an organiza
tion's image and that the crisis response should be linked to the type of crisis situation.
Based on this premise and the neoinstitutionalism and attribution theories, the sym
bolic approach yields a model with five crisis response strategies and four crisis types.
Future research should include a concurrent discussion of these theories in relation to
actual cases to explore the individual dynamics each crisis presents.
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Conclusion
History illustrates the impact crises can have on organizations and entire indus
tries. The ability to manage a crisis in a manner that minimizes long-term damage is
an invaluable tool to managers. As researchers, we can explore various frameworks
and strategies to gain knowledge about the fundamental workings of crises. This
study represents a first step in the review of actual cases and how the communication
strategies employed influenced organizational image.
Several conclusions can be drawn from this study that impact future research.
First, organizational statements have an undeniable impact on public perception of
organizational image. Hence, it is imperative that communication managers under
stand the communication strategies available and the potential impact of such state
ments. Second, the relationship between accommodative, defensive and control
surveys illustrates a progressive relationship with regard to organizational image. This
warrants further research to determine the extent of such a relationship. Finally, the
study indicates a negative relationship between the public and investors when com
pared with the research of Marcus and Goodman (1991). This is of critical impor
tance since scholarly researchers agree that while one strategy may repair or improve
relations with one group while alienating another (Cheney, 1991; Ice, 1991).
The research presented in this study is an important first step toward the
expansion of quantitative data in the field of crisis communication. While several
limitations exist, the data supports current qualitative research and allows for further
development of crisis communication models.
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Communication Strategies on Public Opinion" has been approved under the
exempt category of review by the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board.
The conditions and duration of this approval are specified fo the Policies of
Western Michigan University. You may now begin to implement the research as
described in the application.
Please note that you may only conduct this research exactly in the form it was
approved. You must seek specific board approval for any changes in this- project.
You must also seek reapproval if the project extends beyond the tennination date
noted below. In addition if there are any unanticipated adverse reactions or
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consultation.
The Board wishes you success in the pursuit of your research goals.
Approval Termination:
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INSTRUCTIONS: Please read the case descriptions below. Following each case description
are six statements company officials made regarding the incident described. Think about the
cases you have just read and the corresponding statements. H you are not familiar with the
case(s), please answer to the best of your ability.
The items below concern your impression of the organization and the crisis. Circle one number
for each of the questions. The responses range from 1 = STRONGLY DISAGREE to 5 =
STRONGLY AGREE.

NASA Challenger
On January 28, 1986, the space shuttle Challenger exploded, 73 seconds after launch, killing
all seven astronauts aboard. The Challenger mission was to have been the 25th mission of the
reusable shuttle fleet that was intended to make space travel commonplace. The worst accident in the
history of the American space program, it was witnessed by thousands of spectators.
As you know, the space shuttle program is built around a team effort.
Flight safety is our No. 1 priority in the space shuttle program.
It's been an open agency and we're trying to maintain that.
We have done an excellent job in ferreting out the weaknesses.
It will take all the data, careful review of that data, before we can draw any conclusions
on this national tragedy.
f. We are going to do a very detailed assessment of the set or circumstances to try and
understand what occurred and we will then, in tum, assess the impact from that to
determine where we go in the future.
g. What we have done here today is to move very quickly so that all relevant data could be
impounded in order to preserve as much information as we can.
h. The space shuttle program experienced a national tragedy with the explosion of the
space shuttle Challenger.

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

The organization is basically honest.
1
2
STRONGLY DISAGREE
1.

3
DON'T KNOW

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE

The organization is concerned with the well-being of its publics.
1
2
3
4
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

5
STRONGLY AGREE

3. I do trust the organization to tell the truth about the incident.
1
2
3
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE

I would prefer to have NOTHING to do with this organization.
1
2
3
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE

2.

4.

5.

Under most circumstances, I WOULD NOT be likely to believe what the organization says.
1
2
3
4
5
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY AGREE
The organization is basically DISHONEST.
1
2
3
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY DISAGREE

6.

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE
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I do NOT trust the organization to tell the truth about the incident.
2
3
4
1
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

7.

5
STRONGLY AGREE

8.

Under most circumstances, I would be likely to believe what the organization says.
2
4
5
3
1
STRONGLY DISAGREE
STRONGLY AGREE
DON'T KNOW
I would buy a product or service from this organization.
2
3
1
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

9.

4

10. The organization is NOT concerned with the well-being of its publics.
2
3
4
1
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY DISAGREE

5
STRONGLY AGREE
5
STRONGLY AGREE

11. The organization made no comments on the crisis beyond providing basic information about the
crisis.
3
4
5
2
1
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY AGREE
12. After the crisis, the organization took action to make changes in its procedures or practices.
1
2
3
4
5
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY AGREE
13. The organization blamed some other group for its problems.
2
3
1
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE

14. The organization said it accepted responsibility for the crisis.
2
3
1
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE

15. The organization took steps which would help prevent a similar crisis from happening again in
the future.
5
3
2
4
1
STRONGLY DISAGREE
STRONGLY AGREE
DON'T KNOW
16. The organization is the party most responsible for the crisis
2
1
3
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

4

17. Circumstances, not the organization, are responsible for the crisis.
2
3
4
1
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW
18. The blame for the crisis lies with the organization.
2
3
1
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW
AGREE

4

19. The blame for the crisis lies in the circumstances, not the organization.
2
1
3
4
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

5
STRONGLY AGREE
5
STRONGLY AGREE
5
STRONGLY

5
STRONGLY AGREE
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INSTRUCTIONS: Please read the case descriptions below. Following each case description
are six statements company officials made regarding the incident described. Think about the
cases you have just read and the corresponding statements. If you are not familiar with the
case(s), please answer to the best of your ability.
The items below concern your impression of the organization and the crisis. Circle one number
for each of the questions. The responses range from 1 = STRONGLY DISAGREE to 5 =
STRONGLY AGREE.
NASA Challenger
On January 28, 1986, the space shuttle Challenger exploded, 73 seconds after launch, killing
all seven astronauts aboard. The Challenger mission was to have been the 25th mission of the
reusable shuttle fleet that was intended to make space travel commonplace. The worst accident in the
history of the American space program, it was witnessed by thousands of spectators.
And Thiokol recommended to proceed in the launch. So they did recommend launch.
There was absolutely no pressure to get this particular launch up. We have always
maintained that flight safety is our top priority - consideration - in the program.
c. There is no intent to cover up and keep things quiet.
d. I do not dispute that the agency's general safety assessment methods are less thorough
than the best available.
e. There is just nothing to report - there were no problems in the control room.
f. I am clearly not in a position to speculate today the length of time involved in making
that determination (to fly again).
g. We knew impounding the film might be illegal, but we are asking for cooperation from
news organizations because the film might have clues to what happened.
h. All I can say is that it appeared from those photos that there was an explosion, and
that's about all I can say at this point in time.

a.
b.

1.

The organization is basically honest.
1
2
STRONGLY DISAGREE

3
DON'T KNOW

4

2.

5
STRONGLY AGREE

The organization is concerned with the well-being of its publics.
4
1
2
3
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

5
STRONGLY AGREE

I do trust the organization to tell the truth about the incident.
1
2
3
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE

I would prefer to have NOTHING to do with this organization.
2
3
1
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY DISAGREE

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE

3.

4.

Under most circumstances, I WOULD NOT be likely to believe what the organization says.
1
2
3
4
5
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY AGREE

5.

The organization is basically DISHONEST.
1
3
2
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

6.

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE
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7.

I do NOT trust the organization to tell the truth about the incident.
2
1
3
4
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

5
STRONGLY AGREE

Under most circumstances, I would be likely to believe what the organization says.
2
1
3
5
4
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY AGREE

8.

9.

I would buy a product or service from this organization.
2
3
1
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

4

10. The organization is NOT concerned with the well-being of its publics.
4
1
2
3
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

5
STRONGLY AGREE
5
STRONGLY AGREE

11. The organization made no comments on the crisis beyond providing basic information about the
crisis.
4
3
2
5
1
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY AGREE
12. After the crisis, the organization took action to make changes in its procedures or practices.
1
2
3
4
5
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY AGREE
13. The organization blamed some other group for its problems.
2
1
3
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE

14. The organization said it accepted responsibility for the crisis.
2
3
1
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE

15. The organization took steps which would help prevent a similar crisis from happening again in
the future.
5
2
3
4
1
STRONGLY DISAGREE
STRONGLY AGREE
DON'T KNOW
16. The organization is the party most responsible for the crisis
2
3
1
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

4

17. Circumstances, not the organization, are responsible for the crisis.
2
1
3
4
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW
18. The blame for the crisis lies with the organization.
2
3
1
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW
AGREE

4

19. The blame for the crisis lies in the circumstances, not the organization.
2
1
3
4
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

5
STRONGLY AGREE
5
STRONGLY AGREE
5
STRONGLY

5
STRONGLY AGREE
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INSTRUCTIONS: Please read the case descriptions below. Think about the cases you have
just read. If you are not familiar with the case(s), please answer to the best of your ability.
The items below concern your impression of the organization and the crisis. Circle one number
for each of the questions. The responses range from 1 = STRONGLY DISAGREE to 5 =
STRONGLY AGREE.

NASA Challenger
On January 28, 1986, the space shuttle Challenger exploded, 73 seconds after launch, killing
all seven astronauts aboard. The Challenger mission was to have been the 25th mission of the
reusable shuttle fleet that was intended to make space travel commonplace. The worst accident in the
history of the American space program, it was witnessed by thousands of spectators.
The organization is basically honest.
2
1
STRONGLY DISAGREE
1.

3
DON'T KNOW

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE

The organization is concerned with the well-being of its publics.
2
4
3
1
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

5
STRONGLY AGREE

I do trust the organization to tell the truth about the incident.
l
2
3
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY DISAGREE

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE

I would prefer to have NOTHING to do with this organization.
1
2
3
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE

2.

3.

4.

5.

Under most circumstances, I WOULD NOT be likely to believe what the organization says.
l
2
3
4
5
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY AGREE

6.

The organization is basically DISHONEST.
4
2
3
l
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY DISAGREE
7. I do NOT trust the organization to tell the truth about the incident.
4
1
2
3
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

5
STRONGLY AGREE
5
STRONGLY AGREE

Under most circumstances, I would be likely to believe what the organization says.
l
2
3
4
5
STRONGLY AGREE
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY DISAGREE

8.

I would buy a product or service from this organization.
l
2
3
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

9.

4

10. The organization is NOT concerned with the well-being of its publics.
l
2
3
4
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

5
STRONGLY AGREE
5
STRONGLY AGREE
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11. The organization made no comments on the crisis beyond providing basic information about the
crisis.
2
4
3
1
5
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY DISAGREE
STRONGLY AGREE
12. After the crisis, the organization took action to make changes in its procedures or practices.
1
2
3
4
5
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY AGREE
13. The organization blamed some other group for its problems.
1
2
3
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE

14. The organization said it accepted responsibility for the crisis.
3
1
2
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE

15. The organization took steps which would help prevent a similar crisis from happening again in
the future.
5
4
2
3
1
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY AGREE
16. The organization is the party most responsible for the crisis
1
2
3
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE

17. Circumstances, not the organization, are responsible for the crisis.
1
2
3
4
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

5
STRONGLY AGREE

18. The blame for the crisis lies with the organization.
1
2
3
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

5
STRONGLY AGREE

4

19. The blame for the crisis lies in the circumstances, not the organization.
3
1
2
4
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

5
STRONGLY AGREE
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INSTRUCTIONS: Please read the case descriptions below. Following each case description
are six statements company officials made regarding the incident described. Think about the
cases you have just read and the corresponding statements. H you are not familiar with the
case(s), please answer to the best of your ability.
The items below concern your impression of the organization and the crisis. Circle one number
for each of the questions. The responses range from 1 = STRONGLY DISAGREE to 5 =
STRONGLY AGREE.
Exxon Valdez
On March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez released 11 million gallons of oil into Prince
William Sound, Alaska. The ship ran aground on the Bligh Reef, 25 miles south of the Port of
Valdez. The spill was the largest taker spill in United States history.
a.

We believe that Exxon moved swiftly and competently to minimize the effect this oil
will have on the environment, fish and other wildlife.
b. We are confident we have the expertise needed to deal with the situation.
c. Nobody ever anticipated a spill of this magnitude when the pipeline plan was being
assembled.
d. I want to tell you how sorry I am this accident took place.
e. One of my people said there was a history of Captain Hazelwood drinking of five years
or more.
f. Exxon accepts full financial responsibility for the damage.
g. Exxon had flown helicopters, equipment and other clean-up materials to Alaska within
hours after the spill.
h. We feel very badly about the damage to the environment.

1.

The organization is basically honest.
1
2
STRONGLY DISAGREE

3
DON'T KNOW

4

The organization is concerned with the well-being of its publics.
3
1
2
4
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

2.

3.

I do trust the organization to tell the truth about the incident.
3
1
2
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW
4.

I would prefer to have NOTHING to do with this organization.
3
1
2
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY DISAGREE

5
STRONGLY AGREE
5
STRONGLY AGREE

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE

Under most circumstances, I WOULD NOT be likely to believe what the organization says.
1
2
3
4
5
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY AGREE

5.

6.

The organization is basically DISHONEST.
3
1
2
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE
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7.

I do NOT trust the organization to tell the truth about the incident.
2
3
1
4
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

5
S1RONGLY AGREE

Under most circumstances, I would be likely to believe what the organization says.
2
1
3
4
5
STRONGLY DISAGREE
S1RONGLY AGREE
DON'T KNOW
8.

9.

I would buy a product or service from this organization.
2
1
3
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

4

10. The organization is NOT concerned with the well-being of its publics.
1
2
3
4
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

5
S1RONGLY AGREE
5
S1RONGLY AGREE

11. The organization made no comments on the crisis beyond providing basic information about the
crisis.
4
5
2
3
1
S1RONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW
S1RONGLY AGREE
12. After the crisis, the organization took action to make changes in its procedures or practices.
1
2
3
4
5
S1RONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW
S1RONGLY AGREE
13. The organization blamed some other group for its problems.
1
2
3
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

4

5
S1RONGLY AGREE

14. The organization said it accepted responsibility for the crisis.
2
3
1
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

4

5
S1RONGLY AGREE

15. The organization took steps which would help prevent a similar crisis from happening again in
the future.
4
2
3
1
5
S1RONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW
S1RONGLY AGREE
16. The organization is the party most responsible for the crisis
2
1
3
S1RONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

4

5
S1RONGLY AGREE

17. Circumstances, not the organization, are responsible for the crisis.
1
2
4
3
S1RONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

5
STRONGLY AGREE

18. The blame for the crisis lies with the organization.
2
1
3
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

5
STRONGLY AGREE

4

19. The blame for the crisis lies in the circumstances, not the organization.
1
2
3
4
S1RONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

5
S1RONGLY AGREE
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INSTRUCTIONS: Please read the case descriptions below. Following each case description
are six statements company officials made regarding the incident described. Think about the
cases you have just read and the corresponding statements. H you are not familiar with the
case(s), please answer to the best of your ability.
The items below concern your impression of the organization and the crisis. Circle one number
for each of the questions. The responses range from 1 = STRONGLY DISAGREE to 5 =
STRONGLY AGREE.

Exxon Valdez
On March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez released 11 million gallons of oil into Prince
William Sound, Alaska. The ship ran aground on the Bligh Reef, 25 miles south of the Port of
Valdez. The spill was the largest taker spill in United States history.
I don't want to point fingers but the facts are we're getting a bad rap on that delay.
We needed authorization. As an oil company we can't just go out and start spraying
clean-up solvents.
c. At that time, we did not have the adequate equipment to gather the oil, nor did we have
permission to begin burning.
d. This incident should never have happened. In my view, it was a human failure that it
did happen.
e. You can't be any more legally qualified to do this work than Captain Hazelwood.
f. Obviously, you don't know what its going to cost now. I cannot immediately determine
the extent of the company's insurance coverage and liability.
g. A lack of authorization from Alaskan and Coast Guard officials contributed to the delay
in efforts to clean up the oil spill.
h. The company does not expect major environmental damage as a result of the spill.
a.
b.

1.

The organization is basically honest.
2
1
STRONGLY DISAGREE

3
DON'T KNOW

4

2.

5
STRONGLY AGREE

The organization is concerned with the well-being of its publics.
4
1
2
3
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

5
STRONGLY AGREE

I do trust the organization to tell the truth about the incident.
3
1
2
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE

I would prefer to have NOTHING to do with this organization.
3
2
1
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY DISAGREE

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE

3.

4.

5.

Under most circumstances, I WOULD NOT be likely to believe what the organization says.
1
2
3
4
5
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY AGREE
The organization is basically DISHONEST.
2
3
1
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY DISAGREE

6.

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE
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I do NOT trust the organization to tell the truth about the incident.
1
2
4
3
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY DISAGREE

7.

5
STRONGLY AGREE

Under most circumstances, I would be likely to believe what the organization says.
2
1
3
4
5
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY AGREE

8.

9.

I would buy a product or service from this organization.
1
2
3
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

4

10. The organization is NOT concerned with the well-being of its publics.
2
1
3
4
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

5
STRONGLY AGREE
5
STRONGLY AGREE

11. The organization made no comments on the crisis beyond providing basic information about the
crisis.
2
1
3
5
4
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY AGREE
12. After the crisis, the organization took action to make changes in its procedures or practices.
1
2
3
4
5
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY AGREE
13. The organization blamed some other group for its problems.
2
1
3
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE

14. The organization said it accepted responsibility for the crisis.
1
2
3
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE

15. The organization took steps which would help prevent a similar crisis from happening again in
the future.
4
1
3
2
5
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY AGREE
16. The organization is the party most responsible for the crisis
2
1
3
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE

17. Circumstances, not the organization, are responsible for the crisis.
2
1
4
3
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

5
STRONGLY AGREE

18. The blame for the crisis lies with the organization.
2
1
3
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY DISAGREE

5
STRONGLY AGREE

4

19. The blame for the crisis lies in the circumstances, not the organization.
1
2
3
4
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

5
STRONGLY AGREE
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INSTRUCTIONS: Please read the case descriptions below. Think about the cases you have
just read. If you are not familiar with the case(s), please answer to the best of your ability.
The items below concern your impression of the organization and the crisis. Circle one number
for each of the questions. The responses range from 1 = STRONGLY DISAGREE to 5 =
STRONGLY AGREE.
Exxon Valdez
On March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez released 11 million gallons of oil into Prince William
Sound, Alaska. The ship ran aground on the Bligh Reef, 25 miles south of the Port of Valdez. The
spill was the largest taker spill in United States history.
The organization is basically honest.
2
1
STRONGLY DISAGREE

1.

3
DON'T KNOW

4

2.

The organization is concerned with the well-being of its publics.
3
4
2
1
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY DISAGREE
3.

5
STRONGLY AGREE
5
STRONGLY AGREE

I do trust the organization to tell the truth about the incident.
3
1
2
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY DISAGREE

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE

I would prefer to have NOTHING to do with this organization.
2
3
1
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY DISAGREE

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE

4.

5.

Under most circumstances, I WOULD NOT be likely to believe what the organization says.
1
2
3
4
5
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY AGREE
The organization is basically DISHONEST.
3
4
1
2
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY DISAGREE
7. I do NOT trust the organization to tell the truth about the incident.
4
2
3
1
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

6.

5
STRONGLY AGREE
5
STRONGLY AGREE

Under most circumstances, I would be likely to believe what the organization says.
2
3
4
5
l
STRONGLY AGREE
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

8.

9.

I would buy a product or service from this organization.
2
3
1
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

4

10. The organization is NOT concerned with the well-being of its publics.
4
3
1
2
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

5
STRONGLY AGREE
5
STRONGLY AGREE
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11. The organization made no comments on the crisis beyond providing basic information about the
crisis.
2
4
3
5
1
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY AGREE
12. After the crisis, the organization took action to make changes in its procedures or practices.
1
2
3
4
5
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY AGREE
13. The organization blamed some other group for its problems.
1
2
3
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE

14. The organization said it accepted responsibility for the crisis.
2
1
3
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE

15. The organization took steps which would help prevent a similar crisis from happening again in
the future.
3
5
2
4
1
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY DISAGREE
STRONGLY AGREE
16. The organization is the party most responsible for the crisis
1
2
3
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE

17. Circumstances, not the organization, are responsible for the crisis.
4
2
3
1
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

5
STRONGLY AGREE

18. The blame for the crisis lies with the organization.
3
1
2
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

5
STRONGLY AGREE

4

19. The blame for the crisis lies in the circumstances, not the organization.
3
4
1
2
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

5
STRONGLY AGREE
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INSTRUCTIONS: Please read the case descriptions below. Following each case description
are six statements company officials made regarding the incident described. Think about the
cases you have just read and the corresponding statements. If you are not familiar with the
case(s), please answer to the best of your ability.
The items below concern your impression of the organization and the crisis. Circle one number
for each of the questions. The responses range from 1 = STRONGLY DISAGREE to 5 =
STRONGLY AGREE.

NASA Challenger
On January 28, 1986, the space shuttle Challenger exploded, 73 seconds after launch, killing
all seven astronauts aboard. The Challenger mission was to have been the 25th mission of the
reusable shuttle fleet that was intended to make space travel commonplace. The worst accident in the
history of the American space program, it was witnessed by thousands of spectators.
The organization is basically honest.
1
2
STRONGLY DISAGREE
1.

3

DON'T KNOW

4

2.

The organization is concerned with the well-being of its publics.
1
2
3
4
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

3.

5
STRONGLY AGREE
5
STRONGLY AGREE

I do trust the organization to tell the truth about the incident.
1
2
3
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE

I would prefer to have NOTHING to do with this organization.
1
2
3
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE

4.

Under most circumstances, I WOULD NOT be likely to believe what the organization says.
1
2
3
4
5
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY AGREE

5.

6.

The organization is basically DISHONEST.
1
3
2
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

4

I do NOT trust the organization to tell the truth about the incident.
1
3
2
4
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

7.

5
STRONGLY AGREE
5
STRONGLY AGREE

Under most circumstances, I would be likely to believe what the organization says.
1
2
3
4
5
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY AGREE
8.

I would buy a product or service from this organization.
1
3
2
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

9.

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE
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10. The organization is NOT concerned with the well-being of its publics.
3
2
4
1
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

5
STRONGLY AGREE

11. The organization made no comments on the crisis beyond providing basic information about the
crisis.
3
2
4
5
1
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY AGREE
12. After the crisis, the organization took action to make changes in its procedures or practices.
1
2
3
4
5
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY AGREE
13. The organization blamed some other group for its problems.
1
2
3
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE

14. The organization said it accepted responsibility for the crisis.
3
2
1
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

4

5
STRONGLY AGREE

15. The organization took steps which would help prevent a similar crisis from happening again in
the future.
4
5
3
2
1
STRONGLY AGREE
DON'T KNOW
STRONGLY DISAGREE
16. The organization is the party most responsible for the crisis
3
2
1
DON'T
KNOW
STRONGLY DISAGREE

4

17. Circumstances, not the organization, are responsible for the crisis.
3
2
4
1
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW
18. The blame for the crisis lies with the organization.
1
2
3
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW
AGREE

4

19. The blame for the crisis lies in the circumstances, not the organization.
3
4
2
1
STRONGLY DISAGREE
DON'T KNOW

5
STRONGLY AGREE
5
STRONGLY AGREE
5
STRONGLY

5
STRONGLY AGREE
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